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 This thesis is a requirement for the Master’s in Social Science, awarded by 
the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. I share the 
view held by many that terrorism posed by extremist radicals, is one of the most 
dangerous security threat today, especially post 9-11. The subject of deradicalisation 
is relatively new in the field of terrorism research. The research is timely because 
Indonesia had recently formalised its deradicalisation programmes for Islamists 
terrorists in 2010. It is also a useful read for policy makers and deradicalisation 
specialists. The methodology used in this research is based on literature reviews and 
field research with informants, academics, and practitioners in Indonesia. Fieldwork 
is the best means to capture experiences and the ground realities to appreciate the 
challenges of deradicalisation in Indonesia. 
 
 The use of the Indonesian language in this thesis is extensive and requires 
the readers to refer to the terminologies provided. However, English translations are 
provided within the thesis for quick reference.   
 
 Readers are to note that some assertions made in the thesis are adapted 
from confidential reports and documents, and citations are provided where possible. 
Some of the interviewees I met were reluctant to reveal their identities, thus, the 
identities of the many villagers and informants whom I met cannot be verified. 
 
 I chose the title A Hazy Redemption: Can Deradicalisation work in Indonesia? 
because it illuminates the main concern of this thesis; the worrying rate of terrorist 
recidivism in Indonesia despite going through the deradicalisation programme. 
Indonesia has thus far been successful in its counter-terrorism efforts through the 
hard approach, but the effectiveness of its deradicalisation programme remains 
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ABSTRACT 
Indonesia’s war on terrorism has been successful, shown by the ability of its 
elite terrorism task force - Densus 88 and the police - to gather intelligence, conduct 
successful arrests and to cripple the terrorist network. With a recidivism rate lingering 
above 10%, Indonesia’s deradicalisation efforts do not share the same success. 
Mainstream literature on deradicalisation has sought to focus on ideological factors 
through disputing the radical’s religious doctrines and religious interpretations. Upon 
reviewing several literatures, there seems to be a detachment between the focus on 
ideological approach and the motivating reasons for the terrorists’ entry and exit from 
terrorist organisations. Several literatures assume that it is achievable to deradicalise 
any form of extremism through the same framework, with some modifications to 
specific conditions. Can deradicalisation work in Indonesia? Using Indonesia as a 
case study, this thesis will argue that disengagement is the best strategy to prevent 
future violence committed by Islamist terrorists and cultural contextualisation is the 
most critical factor in Indonesia’s deradicalisation strategy. The main concern of this 
paper is the worrying rate of recidivism among released terrorist convicts and the 
management of the deradicalisation programme. The radical ideology should be 
aptly contextualised in tandem with the cultural environment in which the terrorist is 
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TERMINOLOGIES 
abangan Refers to the population of Javanese Muslims who 
practice a more syncretic version of Islam 
adzan  prayer call 
amok A Malay word meaning "mad with uncontrollable rage”. 
It is a term for a killing spree perpetrated by an individual 
out of rage or resentment over perceived mistreatment 
aliran  -ism, faith, beliefs 
aksi massa   mass actions 
aurat  body 
aqidah a branch of Islamic studies describing the beliefs of the 
Islamic faith 
bai’a  pledge of allegiance  
Bhineka Tunggal Ika Official national motto of Indonesia. The phrase is Old 
Javanese translated as "Unity in Diversity”  
bid’ah  Innovations in religious matters 
Cultuurstelsel Dutch for “Cultivation System” or less accurately, 
the Culture System  
da’wah  "issuing a summons" or "making an invitation", usually 
denotes preaching of Islam 
dhuha The time of dhuha begins when the sun is about a spear's 
length above the horizon and it continues until the sun 
reaches its meridian 
Dewan Revolusi   Revolutionary Islamic Council of Indonesia 
Islam Indonesia 
 
  x 
 
fardhu    mandatory 
 
fardhu ain   Muslim’s personal obligation 
 
gamis    a long shirt, Pakistan-styled 
 
gerakan  movement 
Gerakan Pemuda   Ka’bah Youth Movement 
Ka’bah 
 
hadith Religious use is often translated as 'tradition', meaning a 
report of the deeds and sayings of Muhammad 
    
halal  An act permitted (legal) by Islamic law 
haram An act forbidden by Islamic law. It also means "sinful" in 
Arabic 
istiqomah   consistent and firm (in obedience)  
fa’i a concept used in Islam to legitimise wealth accumulation 
taken from enemies of Islam without waging a war 
kifayah obligations the fulfilment of which is not mandatory on 
every individual Muslim. Instead, if some fulfil it, that will 
be good enough 
i’dad  preparation for jihad 
ikhwan  brother / brotherhood 
jihad holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty, or, 
a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially 
involving spiritual discipline 
Kafir “Unbeliever” or “infidel”. The term refers to a person who 
rejects God or who hides, denies, or covers the "truth" 
Khilafah Islamiyah  Islamic caliphate 
  xi 
 
khurafat Distorted beliefs or superstitions based on actions and 
nature. 
Laskar Jihad  Warriors of Jihad 
mansuhkan   delete 
Masyumi It was a major Islamic political party in Indonesia during 
the Liberal Democracy era in Indonesia. It was banned in 
1960 by President Sukarno for supporting a rebellion. 
mati syahid Martyrdom. Muslims who die during a fight or struggle to 
defend Islam. It is the highest ideals of Islam. 
mubaligh A group of religious experts who are sent out (abroad) to 
spread their religion through education, education, social 
work 
mudir  head of a school (director) 
Muhammadiyah “followers of Muhammad”. It is an Islamic organisation 
in Indonesia. The organisation was founded in 1912 
by Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta as a reformist 
socio-religious movement, advocating individual 
interpretation of Quran and sunnah. 
mujaheedin “Strugglers” or “people doing jihad”. Muslims who believe 
they struggle in the path of God. The word is from the 
same Arabic word as jihad ("struggle"). 
negara kesatuan  Unitarism 
Padri  priest 
Pancasila The Five Principles. It is the Indonesian state philosophy, 
formulated by the Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno 
pesantren  Islamic boarding school 
perajurit  soldier/army 
  xii 
 
puasa  fasting 
priyayi In traditional Javanese society, a class that comprised the 
elite in contrast to the masses, or “little people” (wong 
cilik). Until the 18th century the priyayi, under the royal 
families, were the rulers of the Javanese states 
Quran The book composed of sacred writings accepted by 
Muslims as revelations made to Muhammad by Allah 
through the angel, Jibril 
qiyamulail prayers done in the evening between one hour after dusk 
until dawn. 
Reformasi  Reformation 
sabillilah  In the cause of Allah 
santri a cultural 'stream' of people within the population of 
Javanese who practice a more orthodox version of Islam, 
in contrast to the abangan classes 
syariah  the moral code and religious law of Islam 
syahadat  to bear witness 
solat   prayers 
sunnah the way of life prescribed as normative for Muslims based 
on the teachings and practices of Islamic Prophet 
Muhammad 
takeyya An Islamic concept allowing Muslims to deny or hide their 
faith when forced to do so to avoid harm 
tafsiran  interpretation 
takfir In Islamic law, takfir refers to the practice of 
one Muslim declaring another Muslim an unbeliever 
or kafir 
  xiii 
 
takhayul beliefs in something which exists and is considered 
sacred/magical, but in actual fact it does not exist 
taklim  to study, seeking knowledge 
tarekat  way, path or method 
tauhid  the concept of monotheism in Islam  
tukang adzan  someone performing the prayer call 
ulama  Islamic scholar  
Ummah  nation or community 
Volksraads People’s Council. It was an advisory body created by 
the Dutch for the East Indies in 1917 

















AMIN   Angkatan Mujaheedin Islam, Islamic Jihad Force 
AKABRI  Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed 
Forces Academy Indonesia 
BNPT  Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, National Agency 
for Combating Terrorism 
BU Budi Utomo, Noble Еndеavor. It was the first native political 
society in the Dutch East Indies 
DI Darul Islam, House of Islam. It is an Islamist group 
in Indonesia that aims for the establishment of an Islamic 
state of Indonesia. A group of Muslim militias, coordinated by a 
charismatic radical Muslim politician, Sekarmadji Maridjan 
Kartosuwirjo, started it in 1942, proclaimed it in 1949. 
Densus-88  Detasemen Khusus 88, Special Detachment 88 
GAM   Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement 
GAPERMIGAS Gabungan Perusahaan-perusahan Minyak dan Gas, Joint Oil 
and Gas Company 
GOLKAR  Golongan Karyawan, Worker’s Party 
FKAWJ Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah. People of the Prophet’s 
Path and Congregation 
FPI Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front 
IP Indische Partji, Indies Party. One of the very first political 
organisations pioneering Indonesian nationalism in the colonial 
Dutch East Indies 
IPAC Institute for Policy Analysis for Conflict 
  xv 
 
IPI   International Peace Institute 
KOMPAK  Komitee Penanggulan Krisis, Crisis Management Committee 
LPI   Laskar Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Force 
MMI Majelis Mujaheedin Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Jihad 
Warriors  
MUI   Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Islamic Scholars Indonesia 
MPR   Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Consultative Assembly 
NII   Negara Islam Indonesia, The Islamic state of Indonesia 
NKRI Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia. United States of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
NU Nadhatul Ulama, Awakening of Islamic scholars. It is a 
traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia 
 
Polri Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, The Indonesian National 
Police 
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party 
PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party 
PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party 
PRRI   Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
SDI Sarekat Dagang Islam (Union of Islamic Traders). Haji 
Samanhudi, a businessman in Surakarta, founded it in 1905 or 
1912. His business was trading in batik. It had as its goal the 
empowerment of local merchants, especially in the batik 
industry. 
SI Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union). One of the first mass political 
organisations in Indonesia. Sarekat Islam was formed in 1912 
  xvi 
 
as a result of the reorganisation of SDI, an organisation that 
reflected the interests of the nascent Indonesian commercial 
and industrial bourgeoisie in the struggle against foreign (mainly 
Dutch) capital. 
TKR Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat, Army for the Independence of 
Indonesia 
UUD Undang-undang Dasar 
TII   Tentara Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Army 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
“Jihad must come first (even if one’s parents are sick). Unless jihad is in (the 
state of) fardhu kifayah (a collective duty, for the nation). If jihad is in (the 
state of) fardhu ain (in the sense of an absolute, individual duty), jihad takes 
priority. There is no obligation to ask permission from one’s parents. But even 
if jihad is still in the fardhu kifayah state, such as jihad to spy on infidel 
countries, Muslims do not require their parent’s permission.”1 
Interview with Abu Bakar Baasyir, Amir of Jemaah Islamiyah, in Cipinang Prison, 
2005. 
Indonesia boasts some of the most perturbing trends associated with violence 
committed by Islamist terrorists, who endorse violence in the name of religion. 
Against the backdrop of the post-9/11 security landscape, the recent violence mainly 
involves bomb attacks, ranging from the deadly twin Bali bombings in 2002, the 
Australian Embassy bombing at the Kuningan District in 2004, the JW Marriott and 
Ritz Carlton bombing in 2009 and the bombing of a mosque in a police compound in 
2011. Deradicalisation programmes in Indonesia have been formalised since 2003 
under a new government regulation, to alter radical beliefs and to bring back 
convicted terrorists into the mainstream society.2 Although these terrorists had 
participated in the country’s “deradicalisation programme” which was praised by 
many security observers, including Sidney Jones, the rate of recidivism is still 
worrying.3 Indonesia’s war on terrorism has thus far been rather successful, shown 
by the ability of its elite terrorism task force, Densus 88, and the police to gather 
                                                          
1
 Interview with Abu Bakar Baasyir, alleged Amir of Jemaah Islamiyah, on 13 August 2005 and 15 August 2005 
from Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. Questions were formulated by Scott Atran and translated for him in Bahasa 
Indonesia by Taufiq Andrie, accessed on 1 November 2013. 
[http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/63/PDF/ijn_00000631_00.pdf] 
2
 The Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010, adapted from the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law (Law Number 
15). Also see BNPT Chief, Ansyaad Mbai’s statement in “Analysis: Deradicalisation – Is Indonesia’s approach 
working?” in Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) News (a service of the UN office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), 15 October 2012, accessed on 15 November 2012. 
[http://www.irinnews.org/report/96552/Analysis-Deradicalisation-Is-Indonesia-s-approach-working] 
3
 Muhammad Djibril, “Sidney Jones: Pemberantasan Teroris di Indonesia yang Terbaik”, in Republica Online, 29 
November 2011, accessed on 22 January 2014. 
[http://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/umum/11/11/29/lvfio7-sidney-jones-pemberantasan-teroris-di-
indonesia-yang-terbaik ] 
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intelligence, conduct successful arrests and re-arrests of recidivists, as well as to 
disrupt the terrorist network.4 However, to what extent has Indonesia been 
successful in rehabilitating these Islamist terrorists and stop them from re-committing 
the violence since the programme’s inauguration in 2003? 
 The idea of running the deradicalisation programme became exigent after the 
2002 twin bombings in Bali. From 2000 to 2010, around 600 convicted terrorists 
were held in Indonesia’s prisons, and about 100 of them were involved in the Aceh 
military training camp, either to participate in the military training or to be trainers 
themselves.5 Those who participated in the Aceh training camp were believed to be 
mostly recidivists in jihadist terrorism, including the case studies discussed in this 
thesis. From 2002 to April 2013, approximately 800 arrests were made and 63 were 
killed in various shootouts with security forces during the arrests.6 Up until August 
2013, Indonesian authorities discovered at least 28 terrorist recidivists out of around 
300-350 convicts released, or about 10% recidivism.7 The rate is higher than that of 
Saudi Arabia and Singapore – which will be mentioned in the next paragraph- , and it 
                                                          
4
 Greg Barton, “Ten Years On: Indonesia’s anti-terrorism advances,” an online article in on ABC.net, 12 October 
2012, accessed on 1 August 2013. [http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4308906.html]. See also assertion made 
by Indonesia’s anti-terrorism chief, “Indonesia: A Model for Counter-Terrorism,” in The Jakarta Globe, 19 
October 2012, accessed on 13 September 2013. [http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/indonesia-a-
model-for-counterterrorism-anti-terror-chief/] 
5
 These convicted terrorists held in prison include those who were arrested before 2000. See Yudha Satriawan, 
“Ketua BNPT: Produk Hukum Terorisme Indonesia Terlembek di Dunia,” in Voice of America – Indonesia online, 
25 February 2011, accessed on 12 October 2013. [http://m.voaindonesia.com/a/90271.html]  
Also see Angel Damayanti’s article, “Is Terrorism in Indonesia a Triumph?” a Commentary Paper produced for 
Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia on 31 July 2012. 
6
 There are varying accounts on the number of terrorists’ arrests made. See for example a statement made by 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Marty Natelegawa during a Counter Terrorism Conference, June 2013 in Geneva, 
accessed on 13 October 2013. [https://www.un.org/en/terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/opening-session-stmt-
Indonesia.pdf] See also Farid Septian, “Pelaksanaan Deradikalisasi Narapidana Terorisme Di Lembaga 
Pemasyarakatan Kelas I Cipinang,” in Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia, vol. 7, no.1 May 2010, pp. 108 – 133. 
7
 Different agencies provide varying data sets with regards to recidivism, ranging from 8%-13%. See for 
example, Noor H. Ismail, “The cycle of recidivism for released terrorists,” in The Jakarta Post online, 21 August 
2013, accessed on 12 October 2013. [http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/08/21/the-cycle-recidivism-
released-terrorists.html] See also, Sabrina Asril, “Mantan Napi Teroris Kembali Meneror,” in Kompas.com, 25 
July 2011, accessed on 10 August 2013. 
[http://megapolitan.kompas.com/read/2011/07/25/11141865/.Mantan.Napi.Teroris.Kembali.Meneror] 
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certainly raises concerns on the quality of deradicalisation programmes in Indonesia. 
Moreover, many of these released convicts have not been receiving proper post-
release monitoring. Indonesia should be concerned because, upon the release, most 
of these terrorists re-engaged in violent activities that destroy lives and properties.8 
 
Can deradicalisation work? Several countries have implemented robust 
deradicalisation programmes. Singapore has released about two thirds of terrorist 
detainees, out of 64 detainees since 2002.9 Figures show that since the inception of 
rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs in Singapore, on record, only one re-
arrest has been made (in 2012).10 While there is no confirmed data on the rate of 
terrorist recidivism, Abuza concluded that deterrence and coercion are significant for 
the low rates of recidivism in Malaysia.11 Malaysia’s Home Minister, Datuk Seri 
Hishamuddin asserted in a media statement that Malaysia’s prison recidivism rate is 
much lower than many other countries with 7.97% in 2012.12 For example, latest 
figures reported that Saudi Arabia posts its recidivism rates to fall within the range of 
                                                          
8
 Refer to Chapter 5 of this thesis on the case studies. Also refer to Table 1 of Chapter 4 for a list of notable 
recidivists in Indonesia. 
9
 See Dobson, W., “The Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore”, in The Washington Post, 17 May 2009, and 
Parliamentary Speech by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs of Singapore, Teo Chee Hean on 
8 March 2013. Excerpts available on [http://www.straitstimes.com/microsites/parliament/story/terrorist-
threat-singapore-remains-dpm-teo-20130308]  
10
 Abdul Basheer, who was drawn to terrorism through the Internet - hence he was labelled self-radicalised or 
more commonly known as a do-it-yourself terrorist - was detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 2007 
in Singapore, after he made plans for militant jihad in Afghanistan. After his release in February 2010, he made 
some headway in re-integrating into society. However, he was caught again in 2012 for wanting to revert to 
undertaking militant jihad abroad. This excludes the re-arrest of JI member, Mas Selamat Kastari who was re-
arrested in 2010 after he had escaped from the Whitley Road detention centre in 2008. 
11
 According to Abuza, Malaysia has not released any confirmed data on terrorists’ recidivism. See article by 
Zachary Abuza, “The rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in Southeast Asia: A preliminary 
assessment,” in Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement, edited by Tore Bjorgo and 
John Horgan, Routledge, New York, 2008. 
12
 It is not known if the rate includes terrorist-related cases. See “Malaysian prisoner recidivism rate much 
lower than in other countries,” Bernama News Agency, 9 July 2010, accessed on 1 March 2014. 
[http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsgeneral.php?id=511940] 
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2-3%.13 Hence, as compared to Singapore and Malaysia within the same region, and 
Saudi Arabia, - with Malaysia and Saudi Arabia having a Muslim majority population 
- the success and reliability of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme remain 
hazy.14 Others, including journalists and the Indonesian government, still claim that it 
is in fact promising.15 To what extent is Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme 
promising and how is success measured?16 Many have also argued that the war on 
terrorism cannot stop at conducting an offensive against the terrorists and putting 
them behind bars.17 While counter-terrorism efforts should be formidable enough to 
stop the violent acts of terrorism from besieging the country, the deradicalisation 
programme epitomise a critical step in the post-arrest phase to rehabilitate these 
terrorists. Ideally, the prisons serve as Indonesia’s fortress to keep away terrorists 
from causing further damage to lives and properties. This thesis also discusses the 
management of Indonesia’s prison system, a key institution in managing the 
deradicalisation programme. Through fieldwork in Indonesia, I will highlight why 
                                                          
13
 See Charles E. Berger, “A Rehab Model for Gitmo Detainees,” in Los Angeles Times online, 20 November 
2013, accessed on 1 December 2013. [http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/20/opinion/la-oe-berger-closing-
gitmo-yemen-20131120] See also, Christopher M. Blanchard, in Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, 
Diane Publishing, December 2009, p. 26. The article mentioned that Saudi authorities reported its recidivism 
rates to fall within the range of 10-20%. The Saudi Ministry of Interior and counter-terrorism advisors in 
Riyadh, 2008, provided the figures during a briefing. 
14
 I will not engage in a comparative analysis with Singapore and Malaysia in this thesis, because of there are 
already available literature which describes the programmes and partly also because of restricted access of 
information.   
15
 Schulze asserts that the Indonesian approach is worth emulating. See article by Kirsten E. Schulze, 
“Indonesia’s approach to jihadist deradicalisation,” in Combating Terrorism Centre online, 15 July 2008, 
accessed on 28 January 2014. [http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/indonesia%E2%80%99s-approach-to-jihadist-
deradicalization] Greg Sheridan claims that the Indonesian programme is the most successful in the world. See 




 There is no available information during the research of this thesis on how Indonesia measures its recidivism 
rates and its method of calculation. I briefly discuss this issue in Chapter 4 in “Comments on Recidivism.” 
17
 Noor Huda suggested a “curative” approach rather than a repressive and combative method. See article by 
Prodita Sarbini, “Systematic deradicalisation program needed: Expert,” in The Jakarta Post online, 26 March 
2010, accessed on 28 January 2014. [http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/03/26/systematic-
deradicalization-program-needed-expert.html] Tito Karnavian asserts that rehabilitation is more important 
than repression. See article, “Indonesia deradicalisation policy struggles,” in Al Arabiya News online, 17 
October 2010, accessed on 28 January 2014. [http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/06/27/112414.html] 
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Indonesia’s prisons are a vulnerable place for terrorists to deradicalise and thus 
implementation of the programme becomes ineffective. It is ironic how prison serves 
as an important environment to play a role as a rehabilitation centre to induce 
positive change, yet it incubates further radicalisation and recruitment of new 
members, making it a vulnerable place for terrorists to deradicalise. 
 
I. AIMS OF RESEARCH 
This paper will examine Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme for Islamists 
terrorists and address some of the issues associated with the management of that 
programme. The main concern of this paper is the fairly worrying rate of recidivism 
among released terrorist convicts, as well as the way the programme is managed. It 
is presumed in this paper that religious intervention is important, but it may not 
necessarily be an effective strategy in the design of Indonesia’s deradicalisation 
programme. Thus, what would be the best way to conduct deradicalisation 
programmes to ensure that the programme participant does not return to violence?  
This thesis will argue that disengagement is the best strategy to prevent future 
violence committed by Islamist terrorists and cultural contextualisation should 
be the most critical factor in Indonesia’s deradicalisation strategy. John Horgan 
asserts that the aim of the deradicalisation programme is to reverse the process of 
radicalisation as well as to ensure that participants of the programmes do not return 
to terrorism.18 Has the Indonesian government done enough to eradicate the 
violence committed by these terrorists through its deradicalisation programme? 
                                                          
18
 John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on 
Radicalization into Terrorism,” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 618, 
no. 1, July 2008, pp. 80-94. Also see John Horgan, “Deradicalisation or Disengagement?” in Perspectives on 
Terrorism, vol. 2, no. 4, 2008. 
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Although there have been prominent successful cases, the report card does not look 
hopeful for Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme upon scrutinising the reported 
statistics and the ground reality. These include: 1) convicted terrorists’ participation 
in the deradicalisation programme for pragmatic reasons instead of renouncing their 
extremist views, 2) the preservation of the jihadist culture – be it intended or 
unintended - through the daily activities in prison, 3) luxurious privileges enjoyed by 
the terrorists in prison, 4) inadequate training for prison wardens and 4) an absence 
of a coordinated effort for the post-release phase of the deradicalisation programme.  
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study seeks to answer several important questions, which include the 
following:  
Firstly, how do individuals get radicalised in Indonesia? 
Secondly, why despite going through deradicalisation programme, some 
participants return to terrorism? 
Thirdly, what should be deradicalised? 
III. ROADMAP 
Chapter two highlights the literature review of the concepts on radicalisation, 
the deradicalisation programme and disengagement. The chapter also seeks to 
identify gaps in research on radicalisation and deradicalisation. The problems faced 
by every country in trying to implement the deradicalisation programme are unique 
and hence, no “one-size-fits-all” solution can be applied across all deradicalisation 
designs and methods. Cultural contextualisation will serve to strengthen the 
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effectiveness of the deradicalisation programme. The chapter will also provide the 
reader with some background knowledge and offer a concise response to the first 
research question on some of the “pathways” to radicalisation. It will also attempt to 
conceptualise “deradicalisation” in the context of Indonesia. Various literatures have 
expounded various definitions. While most incorporate religious rehabilitation to 
induce cognitive shifts, the current state of Indonesia’s prisons makes religious 
rehabilitation counterproductive. It is probably more practical to strengthen the spirit 
of nationalism and reinforce the values of “pancasila” – the Indonesian state 
philosophy - in a deliberate manner through job attachments, social integration and 
constant engagement of these former terrorists in public debates to draw them into 
an intellectual discussion, while dissuading them from violence.19  
Chapter three seeks to illustrate the rise of radicalism in the context of 
Indonesia’s social and political history. It provides background to research question 
one as it outlines some of the key organisations and events that bred radicalism 
among the various extremist groups that existed throughout Indonesia’s colonial 
period, President Sukarno’s era, the New Order and the Reformasi era. While most 
groups are politically motivated, some are just plain religious extremists who want to 
establish a state based on the Islamic syariah laws. Other forms of religious 
extremism shown by these groups include the perversion of several Islamic concepts 
such as jihad, fardhu ain, mujaheedin, fa’i, wajib, halal, haram and i’dad.  
Chapter four will examine several mechanisms of Indonesia’s deradicalisation 
programme and problems plaguing the prison system. The chapter seeks to answer 
research questions one and two. There are several issues associated with the 
operationalisation of deradicalisation programmes despite claims of promising 
                                                          
19
 Examples of former rehabilitated terrorists include Ali Imron, Nasir Abbas and Noor Huda Ismail. 
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results that demand immediate attention and action from the government. These 
include a) freedom of communication access by the terrorist convicts, b) the abuse of 
pesantren At-Tawwabin by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, c) overcrowding in 
prison and d) unrestrained interaction among inmates. The chapter will also attempt 
to outline the evolution of Indonesia’s deradicalisation efforts throughout its history 
starting with the programme implemented for Komando Jihad during the New Order 
period (1965 – 1998). The recurring pattern, which is frequently expressed in 
Indonesia’s deradicalisation attempts, is the constant need to stop the spread of 
violent terrorists’ activities and to reintegrate the terrorists back into mainstream 
society. This requires the process termed as “disengagement”, which will be 
explained in chapter two. 
Chapter five will examine five individuals who are all recidivists. It seeks to 
identify several recurring patterns that could provide an insight as to why cultural 
contextualisation is important. Chapter five also attempts to provide a reply to 
research question three through a deeper appreciation of the terrorists’ culture and 
mindsets. The case studies include Imron Baihaqi alias Abu Tholut, Budi Pranoto 
alias Urwah, Abdullah Sunata, Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan and Luthfi Haedaroh 
alias Ubeid. These convicted terrorist had participated in some form of 
deradicalisation programme with the exception of Abdullah Sunata, who cooperated 
well with the police. However, all of them re-engaged in terrorism and the terrorist 
networks upon release from prison. I chose these case studies among the others 
due to availability of information at the time of research. 
The concluding chapter six will provide a comprehensive analysis of why, after 
dissecting Indonesia’s prison conditions, examining its deradicalisation programme 
and after viewing Indonesia’s social conditions from a bird’s eye view, 
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disengagement may seem a more practical and pressing solution. Moderating the 
jihadist views may seem to be an arduous and resource intensive task. This is 
especially so in a plural society where a myriad of Islamic orientations coexist with 
other religions and cultures, bound by the values of Indonesia’s state philosophy of 
Pancasila, which will be which is set against the historical context of radicalism.20 
One of the key solutions to disengaging the terrorist from violence is to recognise the 
importance of cultural contextualisation and, as such, it requires an effort from the 
government to enforce reforms and change in the way the programme is managed. 
Violent jihadism is indeed a deliberate strategy, and success for the jihadists is 
ensured as long as the terrorist group’s political and strategic will remains strong.21 
Weak inter-agency cooperation and follow-up programme signals a weak political will 
– which is among many other factors - in combating jihadism and recidivism.  
 
IV. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis employs field research to gather data as a qualitative approach 
based on a short period of fieldwork from 2011 to 2013. Through interviews with 
security agency officers and several former terrorists, data is collected. Chapter five 
employs a concise narrative study as a qualitative approach through oral history 
interviews and transcripts of prison interviews. However, the author did not have the 
luxury of spending long periods with the detainees to amass as much field texts as 
                                                          
20
 Pancasila encompasses five principles, which stresses five elements supposed to be common among 
Indonesian ethnic groups. The five principles are: 1. Believe in one God, 2. Indonesia unity, 3. Humanism, 4. 
Social justice and 5. Democracy. 
21
 Robert Pape argues that terrorism is successful at a strategic level when there is political coercion and a 
persistent desire at an individual and group level. Pape asserts that Al-Qaeda’s will fulfill its objectives, such as 
to rid the Ummah from all forms of oppression, if they successfully expel U.S troops from the Persian Gulf 
region through any means, including sustained efforts to exert violence. See Robert Pape, in Dying To Win: The 
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House Publishing, New York, 2005, chap. 1. 
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possible.22 Due to lack of data and inaccessible information, quantitative analysis 
was not attempted. Further research should be engaged to combine the qualitative 
approach with quantitative analysis to measure the success and failures of the 
deradicalisation programme and uncover deep-seated problems of the 
deradicalisation programmes. However, the thesis will provide some cursory 
statistics such as number of arrests and recidivism rates taken from media sources 
as well as primary data.23  
Secondly, the case studies are limited to the five subjects chosen in this 
thesis due to the limited availability and access of data. Exclusion of several 
prominent recidivists is due to lack of access and confidential information. Other 
interesting figures such as Abu Bakar Baasyir and Nasir Abbas were not examined 
in detail due to their extensive coverage and the abundant materials available. The 
author will not be able to add any new value to the vast existing literature on these 
individuals. However, it may be interesting to examine these individuals at a later 
period to see, for example, if deradicalisation works for Nassir Abbas and Ali Imron, 
or can it work for Abu Bakar Baasyir.  
Lastly, data and statistics in this thesis are gathered from various sources, 
mainly through interviews with practitioners, academics, informants, online news 
portals and academic papers. The government has not released any official annual 
statistics thus far. This may be due to the lack of coordination among the state 
prisons or perhaps for political reasons. This thesis provides citations for the 
statistics and interview excerpts where possible.  
                                                          
22
 Clandinin and Connelly refer to the individual’s life stories and experiences as “field texts.” See Jean D. 
Clandinin and Michael F. Connelly, in Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in qualitative research, Jossey-
Bass San Francisco, 2000. 
23
 Primary data refers to statistics released by the government agencies during briefings and conferences. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW  
I. UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION: REASONS AND PATHWAYS 
Before I examine the concept of deradicalisation, it is important that an 
understanding of radicalisation be established. Radicalisation and еxtrеmism are 
complex and multi-faceted phenomena that have bееn successfully еxploitеd by 
terrorist groups in spreading their ideology, even among the most disenfranchised 
segments of the population throughout the world. This exploitation is further shown 
by the strategic use of a variety of media, including the internet, which provides them 
with the ability to disseminate a broad-ranging corpus of indoctrination and 
propaganda, fostering the ideal еnvironmеnt for a virtual ummah where all are 
connected regardless of their geographical location.  
How do we define radicalisation? Several definitions presented in the vast 
array of literatures on the term “radicalisation” highlight the frequent use of it to 
describe the process of change in an individual’s attitude, behaviour and cognition. 
Greg Hannah et al describe it as a process whereby “individuals transform their 
worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal, into a 
range that society consider extreme.” 24 In some cases, these individuals may then 
take a further step and involve themselves in acts of violence. Jenkins asserts that 
radicalisation comprises “internalising a set of beliefs; a militant mindset that 
еmbracеs violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction.”25 In other words, 
radicalisation requires that the individual еntеr a mental process that is 
transformative, with a personality change that conditions him or her to violent 
                                                          
24
 Greg Hannah et al, “Radicalisation or Rehabilitation: Understanding the challenge of extremist and 
radicalised prisoners,” a Technical Report prepared for RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 2.  
25
 Brian M. Jenkins, “Building an Army of Believers - Jihadist Radicalisation and Recruitment,” a Testimony 
prepared for RAND Corporation, April 2007, p. 2. 
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behaviour. The United Nation’s (UN) working definition does an elegant job at 
defining the key concepts clearly. The UN defined radicalisation as the process of 
“adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or 
facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change.”26 The preceding definitions 
highlight the involvement of cognitive and psychological transformations. Thus, being 
a cognitive process, it induces a change in the individual’s reasoning and 
understanding of violent ideologies.27 John Horgan makes an important distinction 
between the terms “radicalisation” and “violent radicalisation” and he describes them 
in the context of a social process. For Horgan, radicalisation is “the social and 
psychological process on incrementally experienced commitment to extremist 
political or religious ideology.”28 Conversely, violent radicalisation is “the social and 
psychological process of increased and focused radicalisation through involvement 
with a violent non-state movement.”29 Hence, the definitions are useful for our 
understanding on the concept of deradicalisation, particularly in comprehending the 
third research question of this paper, what should be deradicalised? 
 
How does on becomes radicalised and join terrorist groups? Several general 
theories deserve some attention. Firstly, the “social exchange” theory as put forth by 
Peter Blau sees that the formation of human relationships can be analysed using 
cost-benefit analysis.30 Similarly, the reason for someone to be affiliated with a group 
is strongly influenced by exchange of benefits due to his membership in the group. 
                                                          
26
 United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, First Report of the Working  
Group on “Radicalisation and Extremism That Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of State Programmes,” September 
2008, accessed on 13 September 2012. [http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf] 
27
 Muhammad Nawaz and Beenish Altaf, "Deradicalisation and Disengagement: Roots and Routes," Prepared 
for Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), 2008.  
28




 Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life, Transaction Publishers, New York, 2009, pp. 100-110. 
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Blau’s theory holds that individuals take part in a relationship based on a sense of 
practicality and not mutual coercion. As a result, they expect returns that are 
proportionate with their involvement and contribution through the group’s activities. 
According to Blau, these individual begin interacting in the social setting and they 
gradually become attracted to the group upon realising the benefits, such as higher 
status in society, economic incentives as well as fulfilling their jihadist aspirations.31  
 
Secondly, using “rational choice” theory in explaining radicalisation assumes 
that getting involved in terrorist activities is derived from rational considerations and 
cost-benefit calculations.32 The decisions made by social and political actors 
constitute an optimal strategy to meet their objectives. The “rational choice” theory 
also asserts that joining terrorism may not characterise a pathological or illogical 
behaviour, but an ideal way to satisfy personal needs under certain circumstances. 
According to Sandler and Arce, suicide bombings are carried out merely to maximise 
the group’s goals.33 However, Crenshaw argues that some terrorists’ behaviour 
contradicts the assumption that that acts of terrorism is an optimum effort to meet the 
socio-political objectives.34 For example, extreme violence by terrorists groups will 
only beget fierce offensive from security agencies, such as retaliation by Indonesia’s 
Densus 88, and this will hamper the former’s overall objectives. Rational choice 
                                                          
31
 Ibid, p. 36. 
32
 I acknowledge that there is a trove of literature on rational-choice theory available. For this thesis, see 
Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice,” in Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, edited by Walter Reich, Woodrow Centre 
Press, Washington DC, 1998. See also, Jeff Victoroff, “The mind of a terrorist: A review and critique of 
psychological approaches,” in Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 1, 2005, pp. 3-42, and,  Margaret A. 
Wilson, “Toward a model of terrorists behaviour in hostage-taking incidents,” in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
vol. 44, no.4, August 2000, pp. 403-424. 
33
 Daniel G. Arce and Todd Sandler, “An Evolutionary game approach to fundamentalism and conflict,” in 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 159, no. 1, pp. 155-162. 
34
 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” in International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, 
edited by Charles W.Kegley, Jr. St Martina’s Press, London, 1990, pp. 113-126. 
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theory does not seem to accommodate the effects of brash action, intellectual 
defects, or emotional experiences.35 Extreme feelings of hatred, strong sense of 
loyalty to a leader could skew rationality, as in the case of strong support for JI 
leaders, Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abu Rusydan, as well as over-ambition.36 If the 
terrorists are rational and strategic in their thinking, they should be more likely to 
disengage upon realising their objective.37 Evidence, however, suggests that 
terrorists often sabotage their own success, even before achieving an agreement. 
Instead, they want to preserve the group and maintain a purpose and meaning, to 
sustain their sense of belonging as well as their need to engage in jihad. Violent 
behaviour supersedes strategic objectives and thus, fulfilling individuals’ needs other 
than the group’s objective.38  
Thirdly, Robert Gurr points out the “frustration-aggression” hypothesis as the 
primary source of the human capacity for violence.39 Joseph Margolin echoes Gurr’s 
views that terrorists’ behaviour is a response to frustration arising from political, 
social and personal needs.40 However, this argument assumes simple causal 
mechanism in which aggression is always the consequence of frustration. A better 
approach would be to examine subcultural theories, which takes into account that 
terrorists are living according to their own subculture and value system.41 The 
transmission of values and attitudes of one’s subculture – such as fanatism - will 
                                                          
35
 See David W. Brannan et al, “Talking to Terrorists: Toward an Independent Analytical Framework for the 
Study of Violent Substate Activism,” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24, no.3, 2001, pp. 1-5.  
36
 Jeff Victoroff, “The mind of a terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches,” in Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, op. cit. 
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Jerrold Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces,” in Origins of 
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, edited by W.Reich, Woodrow Centre Press, 




 Ted R. Gurr, in Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 36. 
40
 Joseph Margolin, “Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism,” in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
edited by Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, Jon Jay Press, January, 1977, pp. 273-274. 
41
 Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, in The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in 
Criminology, Routledge, New York, 2001, chap. 3. See also Franco Ferracuti and Marvin E. Wolfgang, in The 
Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory of Criminology, Routledge, New York, 2013, chap. 3. 
  15 
 
undoubtedly drive aggressive behavior. Some scholars also argue that the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis is misleading because the hypothesis says very 
little about social psychology of prejudice and loathing. The hypothesis also focuses 
too much on extremism that “acts of terrorism only play a role as the main motivator 
for encouraging extreme violence.”42 Paul Wilkinson refines this further and asserts 
that “politically-motivated terrorism” cannot be understood outside the context of the 
terrorists and their development, such things that include ideology, beliefs, and 
culture.43 
 
Lastly, Erikson’s theory of “identity formation” states that terrorists will be 
inclined to assume a negative identity.44 An example would be the members of 
Komando Jihad, who view themselves as members of an oppressed Islamic group 
during the New Order era who were disappointed by the failure to crush communism 
and form the Revolutionary Islamic Council of Indonesia. As a result, they take on 
the negative identity of being a terrorist group. Knuston believes that individuals get 
involved in terrorism to express feelings of anger and helplessness due to the 
absence of alternatives.45 Numerous studies have highlighted evidence that 
individuals who become terrorists often stem from the population that consist of 
individuals who are unemployed, with no job security, socially alienated, and society 
dropouts. Therefore, these individuals become motivated to engage in terrorism 
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 Jeanne N. Knuston, “Social and Psychodynamic Pressures Towards a Negative Identity,” in Behavioral and 
Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism, edited by Yonah Alexander and John M. Gleason, Pergamon Press, 
New York, 1981, chap. 6 and 7. See also Erik H. Erikson, in Childhood and Society, W. W. Norton & Company, 
1963. Erikson talks about identity formation. Combining the insights of clinical psychoanalysis with a new 
approach to cultural anthropology, the book deals with the relationships between childhood training and 
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when their grievances and shortcomings are not addressed. Models of personal 
paths sometimes show that when the group selects terrorists, these terrorists often 
originate from high-risk communities and they suffered from low self-esteem in the 
earlier period of their lives. While in society, they failed to obtain the desired place 
and status, and this swells their frustration that encourages them to pursue for a new 
identity. According to Erikson, their underlying need for being part of a terrorist group 
is a symptom of psychosocial identity, either incomplete or fragmented.46 
Interestingly, indulging in violent social, cultural, and political activities improves their 
personal relationships with other terrorists and this leads to membership with other 
violent groups.47 
 
In addition to the above approaches, John Horgan notes that 
“psychodynamic” theory is statistically the most popular psychological explanation for 
terrorism.48 Many studies posit that terrorist behaviour is dеpеndеnt on the individual 
psyche in attempts to link personality traits to violent behaviour. In addition, many 
studies examining identity formation and its relationship to terrorist behaviour also 
view an individual’s psyche as the source of nееds-drivеn motivation that leads an 
individual to take action. As a result, the influence of cultural factors tends to be 
minimised because they generally fall outside the research paradigm of general 
psychology.  
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 Kohut echoes this argument by Erikson. See Heinz Kohut, in The Analysis of the Self, International 
Universities Press, New York, 1971, pp. 120-124. Kohut further proposes that the psychologist should 
empathically experience the world from the patient's point of view (temporary indwelling) so that the patient 
feels understood. This is relevant when we talk about handling counselling sessions in deradicalisation 
strategies.  
47
 For Erikson, personal identity represents one’s set of goals, values and beliefs, which include relationships 
with family and friends. See Waterman S. Alan, “Identity, the identity statuses, and identity status 
development: A contemporary statement,” in Developmental Review, no. 19, pp. 591–621. 
48
 Horgan finds that psychodynamic accounts for political violence continue to be employed, based on the 
assumption that violence is the result of latent desires going back to early childhood experiences. See John 
Horgan, in The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, New York, 2003, pp. 50-53. 
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While the theories and hypothesis on “radicalisation” offered by 
aforementioned scholars in general are apt, practitioners in the security agencies, 
law enforcement and the judiciary easily blame religion as the root cause of 
radicalisation among Islamists terrorists. Does Islam cause radicalisation? Among 
Western scholars, there is a visible reticence to specify directly that Islam is the 
central culprit in the radicalisation of Islamist groups, although others are more 
careful on assigning the blame. It is fair to say that perverted ideals of Islam can 
contribute to the development of the radicals, and thus, deradicalisation targeting at 
ideological rehabilitation should be the solution. However, there have been calls to 
focus on non-ideological factors such as the depletion of all other means of political 
dialogue to achieve their objectives, poverty, oppression and desire for autonomy.49 
For example, an individual can appear radicalised as an excuse to commit violence 
while gaining sympathy from Muslims. In other words, “terrorists” can make use of 
“radicalisation” to mask his criminal intentions so that the court will try him as a 
terrorist in court.50  
In the context of post-9/11 security landscape, some argue against the claim 
that religion is at the heart of most conflicts. Robert Pape argues in Dying to Win that 
an ardent desire to defend a territory motivated suicide bombings. Even in Indonesia 
- one of the top five countries with the largest influence of salafism (26 million 
followers) - extreme religious groups are not truly seeking to spread Islam or any 
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 Rachel Weir, “Islamic Radicalisation and Jihadist Terrorist Activity in the South Pacific: Jemaah Islamiyah,” in 
Global Security Studies, 2012, vol. 3, no. 4, p. 42. 
50
 This is a crucial fact to note, because terrorist convicts enjoy certain privileges in Indonesian prison as 
compared to other non-terrorist inmates, such as special prison programmes, employment and more attention 
given. 
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other ideology to non-Islamic population.51 For Pape, religion matters, but one must 
look at the context of national resistance against the enemy, which can be the 
government or a particular nationality. Political motivations and economic incentives 
are far more influential than religious extremism in the case of suicide bombings. He 
argues that most suicide bombers are not uneducated, immature religious zealots or 
social losers. They collectively believe that their territory and culture are invaded and 
the invader cannot be overthrown.52 Bilveer Singh discusses socio-political 
motivations for radicalisation of Islamists terrorists and characterises the state of 
religious extremism vis-à-vis the current state of military and state affairs. He calls for 
rigorous commitment and communication with local Muslims and breaking the 
terrorists’ regional network rather than addressing their religious dissatisfaction.53 
Thus, scholars have stressed for the history of Islam to be understood in the context 
of its wider political history.54 The abovementioned views do not necessarily argue 
for religion as the cause of radicalisation, but among other causes, religion is indeed 
problematic. Religion becomes a medium to endorse violence and the dilemma of 
assigning blame to religion as the main cause of radicalisation sets in when we try to 
find absolute differences in motivations for radicalisation. 
While some scholars choose not to focus on religion as the main cause of 
radicalisation, Rohan Gunaratna et al argue that individuals are usually ideologically 
                                                          
51
 Robert Pape, in Dying To Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, Random House Publishing, New York, 
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 Pape draws his study from a demographic profile of over 460 men and women attackers. 
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Security International, 2007, p. 94. 
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driven and not operationally driven.55 Hence, they argue for the dismantling of the 
terrorists’ ideological beliefs as an effective way to stem the current global wave of 
terrorism. Here, we see nuances of ideological blame on radicalisation. As will be 
discussed later, ideology on its own may not be adequate enough to drive 
radicalisation. Some may be drawn to terrorism due to friendship or just out of anger 
and vengeance. The excerpt below is taken from an account written by Roki 
Aprisdianto, a former Klaten-based terrorist who was arrested in 2011.  
 
“Ah, Polda. Rasanya masih terasa kebersamaan bersama beberapa ikhwan. 
Disana kami biasa saling bercanda. Terutama dengan ikhwan-ikhwan bom 
buku dan kelompok senjata Abu Umar. Tiada hari yang terlewatkan kecuali 
selalu ada canda disana. Aku sangat sedih berpisah dengan mereka tapi 
jalan ini lebih wajib untuk ku tempuhi. (Ah, the Regional Police. I still feel a 
sense of camaraderie with a few of my brothers, especially with my friends 
from the book bombs and Abu Umar’s group. Not a day passed that we did 
not chat there. I was very sorry to leave them but I had to move on (for my 
wives and kids)”56 
 
On 10 December 2012, Roki was recaptured. After his first arrest, he had 
managed to get a small group together to build a simple bomb that two members 
planted in front of the police station in Pasar Kliwon, Solo on 20 November 2012. 
However, a passer-by saw it, and it was quickly dismantled by a bomb squad. He 
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 Rohan Gunaratna et al, "Detainee Deradicalisation: A Challenge for psychological Science," in Observer, 
Association for Psychological Science, vol. 23, no. 1, January 2010. 
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 Roki Aprisdianto, “Catatan Hati Seorang Singa Penjebol Dinding Bengisnya Penjara - Roki Aprisdianto alias 
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was tried again and sentenced to nine years in August 2013, which he will 
presumably have to serve on top of the time remaining from his first sentence. While 
the interview excerpt highlights that Roki might be ideologically driven, Polri believes 
that Roki is just a plain hardcore and mischievous criminal who had planned to bomb 
police stations and even mosques.57 
 
Hence, it is not possible to narrow down a single cause of radicalisation as 
individual and environmental factors contribute in the same magnitude to the 
development of this issue. Frameworks have been established by various scholars in 
trying to understand the development of terrorism, although most of these theories 
are banked on the environmental cause of the terrorist and not the individual’s 
motivations towards engaging in these activities.58   
 
II. DERADICALISATION AND DISENGAGEMENT 
Since the concept of deradicalisation is fairly new, there seems to be a lack of 
academic debate over theories of deradicalisation. However, the concept of 
disengagement has been around for some time. The question of determining why 
individuals move away from terrorism has garnered little interest, hence, suffering 
from a general apathy from analysts in the field. The practice of deradicalisation 
initiatives has nevertheless еnjoyеd considerable attention from counter-terrorism 
initiatives worldwide for their alleged outcomes and successes.  
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Equally gaining attention is the concept of “disengagement.” Disengagement 
occurs when an individual or a group no longer engages in violence or the individual 
no longer participates in the violent activities of the group. Conversely, 
deradicalisation occurs when a group or an individual no longer believes in a violent 
ideology. The two processes are important in theorising the perpetrators of the 
violence, such as the extent of the terrorists’ radicalisation, why and how people 
participate in acts of terror and violence, as well as how to stop these actions. The 
end result of the deradicalisation programme does not necessarily lead to complete 
deradicalisation. Deradicalisation is an outcome that very few violent terrorists can 
achieve. Often, most will go into relapse upon release from prison without post-
release monitoring efforts.  
 
III. DERADICALISATION  
Several authors have described deradicalisation as a process involving a 
cognitive shift, including Omar Ashour, Khan and Altaf, Gunaratna et al and 
Chowdhury and Hearne. Ashour, together with Chowdhury and Hearne, argue for a 
change in the fundamental beliefs of the terrorists. Thus, religious rehabilitation is a 
key strategy, but Chowdhury and Hearne assert that deradicalisation will work vis-à-
vis a successful disengagement. While Gunaratna et al concur with Chowdhury and 
Hearne, the former call on the programme implementers to foster a strong rapport 
with the terrorists. Rabasa et al on the other hand argue for the need to delegitimise 
the terrorist groups and erode the confidence of programme participants on their 
former group as a more appropriate deradicalisation strategy spurred by the 
disengagement process. This is essential to steer the programme participants away 
from the terrorist network. Several literatures reviewed in this thesis urge for the 
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building of an effective deradicalisation strategy that promotes sustained 
disengagement. 
 
 Omar Ashour, a political scientist and author of The Dе-Radicalisation of 
Jihadists, defines the concept of deradicalisation as “a process of relative change 
within radical movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and 
delegitimises the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving 
toward an acceptance of gradual, social, political and economic changes within a 
pluralist context”.59 He goes on to say that while deradicalisation requires the 
abandonment of violence, it can go without delegitimising the ideological reasons 
that permit society’s norms to be violated and the use of violence. In other words, 
deradicalisation can take place at either a behavioural level or ideological level. For 
Ashour, successful deradicalisation should ideally occur on all three levels: 
behavioural, ideological and organisational.60 Due to the shortcomings on the 
management and implementation of the deradicalisation programme in Indonesia 
that will be explained in chapter four, I feel that such a benchmark would be far-
fetched for Indonesia at this moment. 
 
Khan and Altaf define deradicalisation as “a fundamental transformation in 
understanding and a reorientation in outlook, often due to some personal traumatic 
experience of the violent ideologies, engendering post-traumatic growth in the form 
of rehabilitation.”61 From this definition, it is clear that deradicalisation is a thought 
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changing process. This definition also suggests that deradicalisation is a process 
that takes place after an individual has already been exposed to violent ideologies 
and is willing to change thought patterns because of the effect that the ideologies 
have had on him.62 Hence, to some extent, this is true given the fact that 
deradicalisation programmes are much easier to implement when involving 
individuals who have had first-hand experience engaging in these ideologies and are 
willing to change.63  
Alternatively, Gunaratna et al view deradicalisation as a process on a 
continuum.64 They are of the opinion that an ideal type of rehabilitation includes 
capturing the “hearts and minds” of the terrorists and successfully reintegrating them 
into society through religious re-education, psychological counselling, social 
engagement and vocational training.65 The authors seem to get this understanding 
from the aims of these programmes, they are more interested in the process that is 
part of the concept, and their understanding is based on what is altered in the 
process of deradicalisation.66 Thus, the deradicalisation programmes are built on the 
assumption that “terrorism is a terrorism-justifying ideology.”67 It is thus difficult to 
use force in combating of terrorism because in the end, these ideologies will still be 
reinvented and reinvigorated, posing even greater challenges. Deradicalisation 
programmes aimed at dismantling and delegitimising the terrorism ideologies, 
according to the authors, are perhaps most effective methods of combating the 
issue.  
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Chowdhury and Hearne view deradicalisation as involving a cognitive shift, 
and that the process should involve a fundamental change in understanding.68 The 
explanation on deradicalisation is contrasted with disengagement that the latter is 
defined as a behavioural change that may involve leaving the group and not 
engaging in terrorist activities.69 However, the authors argue that disengagement 
does not usually involve a change in ideals or values. Therefore, the authors link the 
two by saying that deradicalisation only occurs with a change in behaviour 
(disengagement) and involves delegitimising the radicals’ rhetoric and tactics in the 
eyes of the public. These sentiments are also echoed by other scholars as already 
discussed above.70 
Rabasa et al define deradicalisation by first seeing it as a process of de-
legitimisation in which individuals lose confidence in a given system and slowly 
retreat from their own group, because he or she no longer feels part of the group. 
Hence, the programme participants doubt the group’s values and its members. The 
terrorist groups are progressively dehumanised and regarded as possible 
adversaries to the programme participants. Thereafter, all deradicalisation efforts for 
the programme participants are now focused towards providing the participants with 
a new environment and belief system, in the hope of moderating the participants’ 
views towards moral values, global issues, religion and society. The authors also 
define deradicalisation as the opposite of radicalisation.71 They view it as a process 
of becoming less radical through a change in behaviour and beliefs. The behavioural 
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change involves a cessation of the violent activities performed by the individual and 
the belief change primarily involves an increase in confidence in the new system and 
a desire to be in the system.72  
 
Most researchers would distinguish the term “deradicalisation” from “counter-
radicalisation.” The latter refers broadly to policies and programs that attempt to 
dissuade individuals at risk of radicalisation from becoming radicalised or “crossing 
the line and becoming terrorists”, which is part of the ”counter-terrorism” strategy. 
Thus, counter-terrorism strategy involves “a package of social, political, legal, 
educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected - 
and possibly already radicalised - individuals from crossing the line and becoming 
terrorists.”73 In other words, counter-radicalisation works upstream to prevent 
radicalisation by reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience.  
IV. DISENGAGEMENT  
John Horgan describes disengagement as a process in which the individual’s 
role within an organisation changes from violent participation to a less active role.74 
Horgan also asserts that disengagement alone does not necessarily bring about 
deradicalisation nor is deradicalisation a “necessary accompaniment to 
disengagement.”75 Hence, the process of disengagement would be different for each 
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individual.76 The factors that encourage the disengagement process may provide the 
tools to build a strategy towards an efficient deradicalisation programme and the 
process involves both physical and psychological factors. Psychological factors may 
entail a change of priorities in the individual’s mind towards the group, including 
developing negative sentiments or disillusionment with the political aims and actions 
of the organisation. Physical disеngagеmеnt entails moving away from opportunities 
to engage in violent behaviour. Arrest, imprisonment and death are characteristic of 
the typical kinds of disеngagеmеnt. Abundant research on disеngagеmеnt 
processes involving different types of groups has bееn carried out, the most 
prominent being the deprogramming of individuals belonging to cults.77  
 
Concerning disеngagеmеnt of individuals from cults, a number of best 
practices have bееn identified that are broadly applicable to other groups.78 Firstly, 
the exposure of a cult member to outside society was more likely to influence his 
behaviour and lead him to leave the organisation. Secondly, the intimate relationship 
with a person outside of the cult lessens an individual’s obligation to his cult group 
and augments the likelihood of the latter to defect. Third, if the cult member did not 
consider the demands of the cult to be vital to the mission, the likelihood of defection 
from the cult increased. Fourth, if the cult failed to satisfy the emotional nееds of the 
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member, or failed to create strong group cohesion, defection was likely imminent. 
Fifth, family disapproval was an important factor in the decision to desert the group.79 
 
Many of the factors еncountеrеd in the disеngagеmеnt processes from cult 
groups are similar to those of еxtrеmist and terrorist groups. Undoubtedly, the 
disengaged еxtrеmist may not necessarily be repentant or ‘deradicalised’ at all. Tore 
Bjorgo, author of Leaving Terrorism Behind, identifies two essential factors in the 
decision of the terrorist to leave the group: the “push” and “pull” factors.” The “push” 
factors are еssеntially negative circumstances, such as a lack of commitment 
towards the organisation. Еithеr the individual is no longer еnticеd with the 
ideological motivations that initially had radicalised him, or he has rеcеivеd parental 
or social disapproval. The “pull” factors are opportunities with promising potential, 
such as a job. Educational prospects could also be jeopardised if an individual’s 
group membership were known and a desire to establish a family was also identified 
as some of the strongest motives for leaving a militant group. 
 
 Bjorgo identifies several factors in support of the disеngagеmеnt process, 
including a public rupture from the organisation еvеn when the ideology remains 
strong, and a gradual retreat from the group. Conversely, Bjorgo also found that 
individuals might be adamant to leave a group for fear of lacking social ties outside 
of the group or lack of еmploymеnt opportunities, given that many join terrorist 
groups for opportunistic or economic reasons. The individual may also fear 
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retaliation and lack of protection, which often causes him to delay his decision to 
leave the group.80 
 
Changing the perception of terrorist is another approach Mark Woodward et al 
put forth.81 The authors assert that changing the individual’s perceptions is an 
approach more realistic and pragmatic than changing the latter’s identity and 
worldviews regarding terrorists and perpetrators of violence in Indonesia. They also 
concluded that disengagement should not be so dramatic, but the impact of altering 
the terrorists’ perceptions is very important in order to reduce incidents of violence 
and terrorism.82 
V. CONCEPTUALISING ‘DERADICALISATION’ IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INDONESIA 
Indonesia has designed many variants of deradicalisation programmes 
including community outreach programs to inoculate vulnerable groups against 
extremist ideology through travelling “road shows” of popular Islamic scholars who 
reject violence; innovative use of the Internet and other media to counter jihadist 
narratives; and youth activity programs directed at young men in their late teens and 
early twenties who might otherwise be subject to recruitment. Taken a step further, 
deradicalisation programmes in general can be aimed at strengthening “moderate” 
institutions – an approach full of pitfalls – or addressing social and economic 
grievances in those areas where marginalisation and discrimination have fostered 
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extremism. However, in Indonesia, most deradicalisation programmes start with the 
prisons. 
 
While the definitions of deradicalisation are fair and reasonable, scrutinising 
the context in which deradicalisation programme takes place in Indonesia and a 
redefinition of the term “deradicalisation” is necessary to illuminate the fact that the 
process should target the individual as well as the community where the individual is 
nested. Secondly, the primary aim of deradicalisation programme in Indonesia 
should be disengagement from acts of violence and the terrorist networks.  
For the purpose of this paper, I shall employ a more pragmatic working 
definition of deradicalisation that is more appropriate for Indonesia. Therefore, 
“deradicalisation” is a managed process targeted at an individual as well as the 
community in which he is nested to refrain from engaging in terrorism for religion’s 
sake, while embracing national values that encourages tolerance and 
multiculturalism. 
From this definition, cultural contextualisation is an important factor in this 
strategy, the programme should also encourage the rejection of violence, and 
acceptance of values as reflected in the philosophy of “pancasila,” which I will 
explain in the next section. I chose this definition because it begs for a more 
personalised and contextualised approach in designing the deradicalisation 
programme. The problem with accepting the general views of deradicalisation as 
presented in the preceding chapters lies in the difficulty or almost impossible task of 
persuading the detainees to moderate their religious views. However, John Horgan 
notes that it is possible for a person to deradicalise successfully at the ideological 
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level, but he does not disengage from committing violence and this is counter-
productive for a successful deradicalisation. Horgan argues that, 
“The disengaged terrorist may not be “deradicalised” or repentant at all. Often 
physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or 
reduction in ideological support”83  
This is because, once released, the individual will re-engage his old networks for: 1) 
social support, 2) because he feels indebted for past assistance rendered to him by 
the old network and 3) he fears retaliation by the group if they suspect he revealed 
secret information during police interrogation. It is more difficult to ensure that 
terrorists do not return to their old friends in the absence of post-programme efforts 
and nonchalant treatment of these terrorists by society. I will discuss in the later 
chapters how addressing the ‘cultural context’ will ease some of the problems 
associated with the implementation and management of the deradicalisation 
programme. 
Hence, the working definition does not necessarily require that 
deradicalisation would eventually persuade the programme participants to abandon 
their extremist views on religion. As for success cases such as Nasir Abbas and Ali 
Imron, it is unclear to what extent they are deradicalised, given the enormous 
assistance and resources they acquired from the police. Based on my observation 
on several case studies, as well as the fairly high rate of recidivism of 10% for 
Indonesia, it is clear that programme participants will disengage from violence, but 
will not be easily persuaded to abandon their jihadist interpretation of Islam and 
aspirations for an Islamic state, hence, the title of my thesis, “a hazy redemption”. 
                                                          
83
 John Horgan, in Walking Away from Terrorism, op. cit., p. 27. 
  31 
 
Released detainees often made known their rejection on the use of violence and 
killing of civilians. However, some like Abu Rusydan openly displays fervent anti-
establishment sentiments and harbour aspirations to establish an Islamic state 
based on syariah laws in Indonesia. 
VI. PANCASILA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DERADICALISATION 
Pancasila was formulated in 1945 partly through the contributions of 
renowned Islamic scholars in Indonesia.84 The Quran and hadith were used as 
inspirations to pen down their philosophical contributions because they contain 
timeless values that are appropriate for the people of Indonesia.85 Therefore, in 
countering radicalism and terrorism, it is apt to employ Pancasila as an instrument of 
deradicalisation by the government and the community. Although radical Muslim 
groups have ardently rejected the philosophy of Pansasila, it would be useful for the 
government to revive the spirit of Pancasila through national education. 
Therefore, sensitising radicals with the values of Pancasila can be an effective 
way to encourage disengagement or even deradicalisation.86 A Muslim who upholds 
Pancasila will have guided principles to instil a mindset that rejects extremist 
ideologies through his aqidah (faith), ibadah (obligations), muamallah (civil 
transactions), adab (manners) and akhlak (morals). How so? I will use some of the 
principles of Pancasila to explain. 
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The first principle of Pancasila - believe in the one and only God - encourages 
an individual to recognise that his or her conception of God may be different from the 
conception of God to others. This difference will not cause conflict, because there is 
no compulsion in the conception of God. A Muslim who comprehends Pancasila will 
understand that people belong to different religions. Hence, any religious devotee 
will adhere to similar principles, such as duty to God, fellow human beings and the 
environment in general. The second principle – just and civilised humanity – allows 
an individual to balance fundamental human rights and freedom with the individual’s 
obligation toward society and state. This principle highlights the idea that 
relationships within society and state should be based upon a just and civilised 
morality.87 As for the third principle – unity of Indonesia – the people and the 
government should join hands to ensure the success of the deradicalisation 
programme manifested through the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme 
(National Agency for Combating Terrorism, BNPT). The government should 
therefore play the facilitator role by bringing together renowned religious leaders, 
motivators and social workers to contribute their expertise in the various stages of 
the deradicalisation programme. The reformation of the national education system 
should entail, which imbues the “pancasila” mindset, rather than just giving away 
formal information about the five principles in the classroom. Hence, reinforcing the 
“Pancasila” mindset in the education system would reduce the chances of 
radicalisation in communities. Many political leaders and top civil servants have 
spoken publicly for the need to inculcate these values among Islamic radicals via 
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deradicalisation programmes.88 As such, reviving patriotism is an important strategy 
as a counter-narrative to the jihadist culture.  
 Can the exploit of “Pancasila” narratives facilitate deradicalisation? The 
working definition of deradicalisation thus attempts to answer an important question, 
“what are we deradicalising?” Ideally, the result of the deradicalisation programme 
should be the abandonment of extremist religious views. However, bearing in mind 
the difficulties faced by the government to control the proliferation of radical ideas in 
mosques, pesantren and the internet, the most exigent outcome is to discourage 
political and social violence. One way is to permeate the values of Pancasila in 
prison, as well as the community to counter jihadists’ narratives. This could 
discourage recidivism and impede the process of re-radicalisation and recruitment. 
Therefore, the Indonesian government should infuse a sustained outreach effort with 
the values of Pancasila through the state’s national education programme and public 
seminars. Islamic radicals are accepted and tolerated in some Indonesian village 
mosques, and these mosques are gaining participation from Muslims with diverse 
orientations, even from neighbouring villages. Hence, deradicalisation programmes 
in prisons should be adopted and extend its target at a national level, particularly in 
rural and small town communities where the released terrorist are usually nested.  
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VII. CAN RADICALISM BE REVERSED? 
Can radicalism be reversed? Some have argued that the process can actually 
be reversed while others claim otherwise due to a number of systemic influences. 
The question begs us to appreciate the motivations of individuals to engage in 
terrorist activities.89 Barrett and Bokhari assert that any discussion of reversing the 
process of radicalisation should first examine what processes the radical individual 
went through to become sufficiently radicalised to take up violent means.90 
Alternatively, reversing the process of terrorism is possible base on their arguments 
that individuals are not born terrorists but they become terrorists through 
indoctrination over time. Hence, there is a possibility of a process reversal for 
individuals to go back to the initial state.91 Those who maintain that the process 
cannot be changed argue on the basis that individuals go through a cycle of learning 
where there they are exposed to new information, ideas, behaviours and attitudes.92 
Although the process does not lead to a permanent change in behaviour and 
perceptions, it is entirely difficult to reverse the process as it is already entrenched in 
the mind and relapse could be inevitable. 
Existing studies on terrorism seem to discover a set of universal principles 
that could shed light on the essential nature of radicalisation, but the process has 
revealed that their methodologies may be inappropriate to understand behavioural 
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experience within a particular cultural context. In reviewing a study on jihadi 
extremism, terrorism scholar Andrew Silke, on one hand, lauds Sageman for being 
able to build profiles of jihadi extremists, while at the same time charging that the 
publically available sources of information used by Sageman were not always 
reliable.93 Silke faulted Sageman for failing to make comparisons with individuals 
who were not members of extremist groups.94 Within the context of this particular 
research design, Silke is essentially alleging Sageman with committing the 
methodological error known as “selection on the dependent variable” in which 
Sageman chose his cases based on the particular value they may have in helping to 
establish patterns. Raymond Bakker replicated part of Sageman's study of jihadists 
in Europe and the former acknowledged Sageman's contribution of underscoring the 
important role of radicalisation and social networks in providing potential entrée into 
terrorist organisations.95 He notes, however, that Sageman's characterisation of 
jihadi extremism as being linked to global Salafi networks does not fit well with 
current European realities in which successful attacks, such as those in Madrid, 
Amsterdam and London, as well as failed attacks and plots, were “home-grown”. 
Moreover, the attacks were carried out without the central control of any organisation 
in the global jihadist movement. Sageman updates his views in a later work where 
he characterises the current version of the global Islamist threat as “leaderless”, 
falling more in line with Bakker on the nature of the European jihadist movement.96  
Sageman’s updated account recognises that the jihadist movement has evolved over 
time and, thus, the study is indeed noteworthy. 
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Consequently, Sageman’s methodology can only offer a snapshot in time. 
While the movement itself continues to morph and change, this approach does not 
account for time and the fluidity of events that Sageman refers.97 It is also 
representative of many studies that seek to use a correlational approach to support 
rebuttable assumptions. For example, Sageman equates attending university and 
obtaining a degree as a measure of educational level without contextualising the 
educational experience of the individual in terms of: 1) quality of education, 2) 
experience in school, 3) the availability of resources and 4) the potential 
discriminatory practices within the school system that the individual would face as a 
member of a particular religious or ethnic minority.98  
 
This data-driven approach highlights another unfortunate feature of many 
current efforts to study radicalisation. As Veldhuis and Staun rightly point out, most 
research on radicalisation, particularly after 9/11, has basically utilised a post hoc 
approach in which terrorist attacks have often been the starting point towards 
investigating the radicalisation process.99 
Research has shown that there is a possibility of reversing the process 
through a comprehensive deradicalisation programme that should encompass both 
soft and hard measures that Densus 88 and the National Agency for Combating 
                                                          
97
 Besides Understanding Terror Networks, see other works by Marc Sageman, in “Confronting al-Qaeda: 
Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond,” a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, presented on 7 October 2009. In the testimony, he talked about the danger of global neo-jihadi 
terrorism. See pp. 13-15 of the transcript. 
98
 See Marc Sageman, in Understanding Terror Networks, op. cit. 
99
 Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, “Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model,” a research project on the 




  37 
 
Terrorism (BNPT) in Indonesia have been trying to achieve.100 Horgan is of the 
opinion some “push” and “pull” factors can actually lead to the reversal of the 
process. However, support is needed for the personalised approach to reduce the 
chances of recidivism. Some of the factors that would lead to a possibility of leaving 
terrorism include, disillusionment with the group’s objectives, the behaviour and 
conduct of the group’s leader, loss of status or rank within the group, inability to 
withstand being a fugitive and loyalty issues between the family and the group that 
cause tension.101 These factors actually “push” or encourage the individual to leave 
terrorist activities. Other pull factors include the opportunity to leave a violent life, 
amnesty, reduced jail terms, financial and social support, re-education, longing for 
peace, ordinary living and starting a family.102 
Despite these pull and push factors that encourage reverting from terrorism, 
the use of a multi-pronged approach has been touted as being more useful. Scholars 
propose a DDR (disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation) approach that 
is seen as effective in reversing terrorist ideals. This approach should involve four 
important issues: (1) go-betweens must be used to encourage terrorist to abandon 
the their actions, to be done in prisons and through counselling; (2) there must be 
religious re-education teaching the mainstream understandings about the Quran103 
and eliminating false theo-political interpretations104 (3) mobilising ex-terrorists, 
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especially those who were in top ranks to encourage individuals to disengage from 
violence, and (4) mobilising family members and peers to provide social support 
during rehabilitation.105 The objective of this approach is to soften the hearts and 
minds of the terrorists to revert from their beliefs and ideologies. In practice, it is very 
difficult to reverse the process of terrorism as this involves a clear understanding of 
the psychological motivations and environmental motivations. A root cause analysis 
is thus needed for an effective employment for the approach.106 Root cause analysis 
provides a method to research and systematically plot the range of root causes 
underlying the terrorist’s origins, grievances and demands. Ideally, mapping the root 
causes will produce the information to articulate appropriate responses from the 
government, hence, providing the aptitude to calibrate its strategies and tactics for 
the particular threat of terrorism effectively. 
Reflecting the frustration in the current state of radicalisation and terrorism 
research, Horgan asserts that a legacy of the reductionist approaches to 
understanding terrorist behaviour is not only confusion about what a psychology of 
terrorism implies, but also the realisation that even some of the simplest analyses of 
terrorists produce inconsistent and confusing uses of psychological findings.107 
Horgan argues for an interdisciplinary approach that will provide a more 
sophisticated understanding of the psychological processes involved in terrorism. He 
suggests that researchers should begin to think in terms of “pathways” instead of 
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“profiles” and “root causes” when seeking to understand terrorist behaviour.108 This 
is where Kumar Ramakrishna, in his book, brings together an understanding of both 
societal influences and individual level factors to make sense of the motivations 
guiding the actions of the members of JI.109 Hence, examining “pathways” would 
presumably include an understanding of the radicalisation process and provide a 
way to understand how an individual moves towards radicalised beliefs over time in 
a fluid and constantly changing social environment. 
 
VIII. CULTURAL CONTEXT 
Most research to date on radicalisation and militant еxtrеmism have nеglеctеd 
the interaction bеtwееn the cultural context and the individual’s cognitive 
dеvеlopmеnt which combine to constantly shape and reshape the individual’s 
worldview that eventually dеtеrminе the individual’s life trajectory. As Valsinеr notes, 
“all human beings are said to belong to society or societies. Yet they do so in 
different ways...”110 An individual is not only еmbеddеd in society but society is also 
еmbеddеd in the individual in a way that is personalised and unique.  
 
When culture is referred to in everyday parlance, we recognise that people 
make different assumptions about the world. Culture is categorised in different ways 
and adhere to different values and beliefs, all of which significantly shape behaviours 
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and ways of thinking.111 Thus, cultural contextualisation should apply to groups 
insofar as participants often hold values, attitudes, beliefs and ideological 
orientations that are often quite distinct from the broader culture and those shifts 
cause social change. There is an extensive body of research in sociology and 
political science that is based upon this view.112 The use and application of the term 
has also been contested and appropriated because culture in today’s academic 
discourse is often more complex and fluid.113 
 
What then constitutes culture in the context of deradicalisation? This thesis 
assumes that there is a deeply entrenched jihadist culture among Islamists terrorists. 
Hence, as with the discussion that will follow, jihadists’ culture consists of a) social 
and personal networks, b) personal and group beliefs, c) attitudes towards jihad, d) 
attitudes of society towards terrorists as well as e) prison conditions. In chapter four, 
the prison conditions in Indonesia will be described in greater details. While these 
components of culture are important, tackling the attitude of society towards 
terrorism and disengaging the personal networks of terrorists are some of the key 
strategies. The government must be able to discourage or stop released terrorists 
from returning to their old terrorist network. Sulastri Osman argues that radicalisation 
is influenced by a number of factors that can be seen to be culturally linked. Thus, 
the understanding of this concept is important to ensure the programme’s 
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success.114 Osman pertinently points out that individual and religious radicalisation 
are actually tied to traditional or cultural aspects, influenced by two factors: blood 
relations and marriage. This is in the context of JI, which is marked by blood 
relations, marriages and brotherhood that facilitate terrorism.115 A cultural approach 
is paramount to understand how these relationships have formed over time and how 
deradicalisation can be applied in specific situations. 
 
However, how can we measure and assess culture in the context of 
deradicalisation? There are several approaches: the “survey-research” approach, the 
“analytical descriptive” approach and the “ethnographic” approach. The “survey-
research” approach measures culture through individual questionnaires. Thus, this 
quantification of culture will lead to the de facto definition of culture.116 While this 
method starts with deep conceptual definitions of culture as “mental models” or 
“underlying assumptions,” their subsequent attempts to measure it by questionnaires 
and the forcing of the data into dimensions derived a priori or by factor analysis 
implies that culture is definable at the surface attitude level.117 Furthermore, if one 
starts with a definition of culture as an aspect of the “deep structure” of an 
organisation or some of its parts, it is unlikely that a pre-determined dimension that 
leads to questionnaire construction adequately cover the conceptual terrain that 
culture deals with in main issue in this thesis. The “analytical descriptive” approach 
requires culture to be described and measure. Thus, culture is broken down 
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analytically into components that are empirically more manageable and settles for 
studies of those components.118 Thus, the core concept becomes undefined and 
implicit but its manifestations occupy centre stage and become the de facto definition 
of culture. These manifestations, which I will discuss in later chapters, include 
Islamic practices, rituals, social networks, principles, mindset and attitudes. This is 
useful as a research strategy. Nevertheless, as a conceptual strategy, it imposes a 
possibly undesirable bias and makes assumptions that may not be valid from other 
points of view. The validity in the true meaning of the symbolic or behavioural 
manifestations may not be decipherable without the fathoming of a deeper set of 
phenomena that tie those manifestations together.   
 
While the ethnographic method is the ideal approach to gather data for this 
thesis as a cultural interpretation, the short span of time spent with the informants 
and interviewees does not allow the author to gather in-depth experience and 
thorough observation. The thesis also lacks the essential elements of an 
ethnographic work. Hence, this thesis does not constitute ethnography, and 
anthropologists do share a core of common expectations about ethnographic 
presentations. However, while this thesis is descriptive and gathered from a few 
interviews, it may contain a handful critical feature of ethnographic works. In other 
words, a descriptive focus is a necessary element, but is only part of what 
constitutes ethnography. Nevertheless, taken from anthropology and sociology, the 
approach begins with an assumption that there are deeper structures that cannot be 
unravelled or understood without intensive and extensive observation supplemented 
                                                          
118
 See articles by Harris and Sutton, “Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organisations,” in Academy of 
Management Journal, vol. 29, 1986, pp. 5-30. See also, Martin and Siehl, “Organisational culture and counter-
culture: An uneasy symbiosis,” in Organisational Dynamics, vol 12, no.2, pp. 52-64.  
  43 
 
by interview data from cultural insiders or the terrorists themselves. Geertz calls this 
“thick description” and this approach brings out the uniqueness and complexity of the 
cultural imperatives.119 Paradoxically, the approach leaves unexamined, the 
conceptual and definitional problems of the cultural concept as applied to 
deradicalisation and radicalisation. A central assumption of this approach is that 
culture can ultimately only be deciphered as it is enacted. Therefore, it implies that 
the terrorists’ culture does not exists conceptually except in the observable 
behavioural manifestations enacted by the group members, in this case the terrorist 
convicts, the non-terrorists convicts and the community in which the terrorist is 
nested. However, this may also lead to vague conceptualisation of culture like “the 
way we do things” or “common systems of meaning” that belies the “depth” of the 
observational methods. Also, this approach forces us to limit our observations to 
some limited aspect of the group’s behaviour and explain that aspect in great detail 
without necessarily tying that entire behavioural set into other phenomena that may 
exist among the terrorists.  
 
Therefore, from an analytical standpoint, culture matters and must be taken 
into account if we are to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the 
deradicalisation process and the pathways that may lead individuals towards 
еxtrеmist behaviour that may culminate in violence. The International Peace Institute 
(IPI) notes that it is particularly important to pay close attention to the context of the 
deradicalisation programme in order to ensure success. The context in this case 
means the cultural environment, social, political, and global climate. Shallow 
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understanding of the individual culture of the terrorist is what defines the success of 
one programme and the failure of another programme.120 
 Understanding the culture is indeed imperative for any policy makers or 
academics who are conducting research in Indonesia, which is an amalgamation of 
multi-cultural societies. Thus, many considerations and sensitivities have to be made 
when implementing deradicalisation programmes. The Indonesian programme is 
actually built on the ability of the deradicalisation officer to adapt to the personal 
experiences of the detainee in order to understand how the detainee feels.121 Culture 
remains an important concept in the deradicalisation of terrorists because a deep 
appreciation of the cultural context would equip the officers running the programmes 
in being able to understand the motivations better as well as other drives that push 
these terrorists to engage in violent activities. The proceeding chapter shall deal with 
the historical account on the rise of radical groups in Indonesia. It sets the stage for 
readers to understand the evolution of terrorism and terrorist groups’ motivations in 
Indonesia.  
IX. CONCLUSION  
Several aspects of the aforementioned concepts can be researched and are 
relevant for the implementation of the deradicalisation programme and to encourage 
disengagement: firstly, the significance of the change in perceptions of actors and 
perpetrators of violence and terror. Secondly, there is a need to trace the 
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background, the ideological and sociological paths, the people who join terrorist 
networks and the understanding of variations in their motives.122 
There are a number of issues that deserves attention from the literature on 
deradicalisation. Most of the above-mentioned studies believe that deradicalisation 
should involve a cognitive shift, a change in beliefs about terrorism ideals.123 It was 
also identified that deradicalisation is a process that flows from disengagement.124 
Deradicalisation begins when the radicals are bombarded with pull and push factors 
in prison that allows them to experience a “cognitive opening,” making them 
receptive to new ideas. The cognitive opening is the result of a traumatic experience 
that challenges the coherence of the individual’s worldview. Thus, deradicalisation 
programmes pick up from this point in order to foster a change in ideals and a 
fundamental shift in understanding.125 
Most of the literature and its understanding on the concept of deradicalisation 
have led to a process-based approach to deradicalisation where the implementers of 
these programmes are focused on change in ideals and a return to normalcy.126 
Many authors, therefore, believe that a shift in ideals is essential for any 
deradicalisation programme to succeed. This is a rather skewed approach to the 
deradicalisation programmes, given the fact that most of these programmes take 
place in the Islamic world. The ideals of the Islam are some of the contributory 
factors to the development of the radicals. Thus, by focusing on these ideals, it could 
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be difficult to change the minds of the individuals or groups engaged in terrorism.127 
Other scholars have argued for a system wide approach to deradicalisation 
programmes by including a change in ideals, in behaviour and in beliefs. This would 
mean that the process of disengagement must precede deradicalisation.128 A 
complete focus on ideologies is not the most effective way to handle deradicalisation 
programmes because of group influence as well as the strong presence of Islamic 
religious beliefs.129 
Terrorism literature has been exhaustive with many of the studies focusing on 
change in ideals and beliefs. Community involvement in these programmes is 
important as well. Individual motivations should also be understood in order to create 
programmes that actually address the needs of the group or the individual, making it 
difficult for them to retreat and go back to their ideals and behaviour. 130 However, as 
what this thesis and other scholars would suggest, there are no one-size-fit all 
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CHAPTER 3: RADICALISM REVISITED IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INDONESIA’S HISTORY 
 
Many countries today experience the menace of radicalism sweeping their 
society. Radicalism in Indonesia is a long-standing phenomenon. It is a part of 
Indonesia’s political history and has been active since the colonial era. Along with 
Muslim sentiments, coinciding with the feelings against Western domination over the 
Muslims, radicalism in Indonesia grew and evolved in various intensity and nature 
throughout its course of history. The next sections trace the development of 
radicalism by various groups – especially Islamic groups - throughout the relevant 
period in Indonesia’s history: the Dutch colonial era, the Sukarno era (Old Order 
era), the New Order era and the Reformasi era. It is also important to note that 
Indonesian radical movements have their origin in reform movements in the Middle 
East, such as Wahhabism. 
 
I. RADICALISM DURING THE DUTCH COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
During the Dutch colonial period, radicalisation among the farmers developed 
due to the widespread economic exploitation through cultuurstelsel.131 This policy 
gave the Dutch and their Indonesian allies’ enormous wealth through export growth. 
While the Dutch introduced modernised industries in Indonesia, colonial exploitation 
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took place. Profits from the system were ploughed back to the Netherland’s state 
revenue. This not only impacted the economic well-being of the Indonesians but also 
their culture. Many of the villages’ institutions were destroyed and cultural practices 
that the natives had adhered to for many years slowly withered. Thus, the tension of 
economic pressure grew among the peasants that led to an insurgency.132 
 
Sartono Kartodirdjo, a prominent Indonesian historian, classifies the various 
insurgencies during the Dutch colonial period into four main categories, 1) the anti-
racketeering movement, 2) revivalist group, 3) chiliastic movement, 4) the local 
Sarekat Islam (SI) movement.133 The four groups used religion as their basis such as 
holy war or “sabillilah,” including the use of orders or “tarekat” in their recruitment or 
during the rebellions, such as the Banten Rebellion in 1750 and the Lombok 
rebellion in 1891.134 For example, the farmers who rebelled on a privately owned 
farm in Ciomas in 1886 - which was categorised as anti-racketeering – were accused 
by the colonial government of being fanatics and using religion as its fuel.135 
Similarly, the revolt led by Achmad Ngisa in 1871, who declared himself as the 
defender of fairness (Ratu Adil), was waged in the name of holy war and the use of 
tarekat.136 
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Among the various types of insurgents, movements that were sectarian in 
nature posed a major problem for the Dutch. An example of a sectarian movement 
was the Padri War, an armed conflict in Minangkabau, Sumatra. It was a 
confrontation between reformist Muslims (known as Padris) and the local chieftains 
who received assistance from the Dutch. The pioneers of Kaum Padri were greatly 
influenced by Wahabiism upon their return from performing the Haj in Mecca.137 A 
similar Padri movement existed in Minagkabau and the movement declared the 
tarekat Syattariyah as a perverted Islamic group because they practised takhayul, 
bid’ah and khurafat.138 The war, which occurred from 1803 to 1839, was initially 
ignited due to disagreements in Islamic matters before it turned into a battle against 
the Dutch occupation. The war began with the arrival of the Padri movement that 
strongly opposed un-Islamic acts in the Pagaruyung district (Sumatra) such as 
gambling, opium and liquor consumption, matriarchy, and the erosion of Islamic 
obligations. The turmoil triggered a split between the Kaum Padri and the Kaum Adat 
during the reign of Sultan Muning Alamsyah and later on involving the Dutch. The 
Kaum Adat sought help from the Dutch and the latter arrived in Padang, Sumatra in 
full battle gear. Realising their battle inferiority against the Dutch, the Kaum Padris 
resorted to guerrilla warfare.  
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Besides confronting the Dutch, the Kaum Padri employed violence against 
those who detracted from the true teachings of Islam, in accordance to the former’s 
practice. According to Abdurrahman Wahid, the Kaum Padri championed several 
Islamic laws which were foreign to the locals such as: a) keeping long beards and 
penalty for those who shaved, b) punishments for female who did not cover their 
aurat except for their eyes and hands and for males who exposed their knees, and c) 
death penalty for those who repeatedly miss their solat fardhu.139 In addition, the 
Kaum Padri permitted slavery. Imam Bonjol, one of their famous leaders who was 
regarded as a national hero for fighting against colonialism, legalised slavery. These 
slaves were acquired during the wars against fellow Muslims whom they regarded as 
infidels.140  
 
The radicalism of the Kaum Padri was further underlined in 1815 during the 
assassination of members of the royal family who had embraced Islam. Tuanku Nan 
Renceh, a padri, punished his own aunt to death for consuming betel that was ruled 
as haram. According to Wahid, the Padris mirrored the Wahabis during its formative 
period and the latter’s followers such as Al-Qaedah and the Taliban. The ideology 
and actions of the ulamas at that time can be considered radical, as they attempted 
to promote social change in a hasty and extensive manner. The ulamas chose to 
engage in conflicts using arms even though during that time, the Kaum Adat was 
less able. The involvement of the Dutch made the conflict even more complex and it 
intensified anti-colonial sentiments even among the non-Padris. 
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Using the concept of nationalism in a broad manner, the first organisational 
expression of nationalist aspirations was championed by Budi Utomo (BU), or the 
“Noble Еndеavor,” formed in Java in 1908.141 Rather than having an explicitly 
political programme, BU functioned primarily as a government pressure group, and 
was particularly intеrеstеd in getting the government to establish more schools and 
to ensure that more natives rеcеivеd modern education.142 The group members 
initially came from the Wеstеrn-еducatеd student population in the major cities. 
However, they group swiftly еxpandеd to include members from the lowеr rungs of 
the Javanese society, еspеcially the lower level of the priyayi. BU was short-lived as 
an organisation, due to internal tensions among the priyayi and its uneasy 
relationship with the Dutch authorities. While the formation of BU was perceived as 
the beginning of organised nationalism, some of its former members, such as Tjipto 
Mangunkusomo and Suwardi Suryaningrat went on to form the more radical Indische 
Party which was an influential political organisation founded in 1912. 
 
II. RADICALISM DURING SUKARNO’S ERA (OLD ORDER) 
 
Before the Japanese occupation, radical groups directed their dissention 
towards the Dutch. In the 1920s, the PKI coordinated an increasingly radical 
movement, voicing defiance against the Dutch. However, the movement waned after 
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the Dutch banned the PKI and imprisoned its leaders.143 The 1930s saw the 
formation of a new radical organisation, Gerindo (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia or 
Indonesian People’s Movement), which was revolutionary in nature. Its leaders had 
been associated with the PKI, PNI, Partindo (Partai Indonesia or Indonesian Party) 
and the Islamic-modernist, Sumatra Thawalib.144 As Gerindo was anti-colonial and 
anti-European, it called for national independence and land reform, which was 
welcomed by the Javanese communities. However, the organisation was short-lived 
due to internal tensions. 
 
After the struggle to secure Indonesia’s independence, divisions in 
Indonesia’s society began to seep in. During Sukarno’s era of Liberal Democracy 
(1950-1957) and Guided Democracy (1957-1965), radicalism was characterised by 
the mushrooming of separatist movements that aimed to establish a state 
independent from the Republic of Indonesia. Sukarno’s secular government gave no 
room for an Islamic state. These movements could not accommodate the terms of 
the establishment of the Republic and responded with violent opposition. These 
included societal differences on religion, customs, fears of Javanese political 
domination and the impact of Christianity and Marxism. As a newly formed 
independent state, Indonesia was facing a fundamental problem in which all the 
parties involved in the struggle to establish it were in disagreement with regards to its 
constitution and state ideology.  
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One such group that opposed the Indonesian constitution during Sukarno’s 
era was the Darul Islam (DI). Muslim militias originally established the DI’s 
predecessor, Hizbullah and Sabillilah towards the end of the Japanese occupation in 
1942.145 Since the proclamation of the DI by Kartosuwirjo in 1949, it was influential 
over large areas in West Java with the aim of proclaiming an Islamic state. The DI 
positioned itself as an alternative to Sukarno’s government and its leaders met in 
1953 to form a united front to proclaim the Islamic state of Indonesia, with 
Kartosuwirjo as its first imam. The DI / Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII) led by 
Kartosuwirjo appeared five years after Indonesia proclaimed its independence and 
the DI/TII was formed to advocate the ideology of Kartosuwirjo with regards to 
institutionalising the syariah laws and to form the Islamic state of Indonesia. The 
rebellion of the DI/TII led by Kartosuwirjo is considered the onset of terrorism fuelled 
by religious grounds in Indonesia. Such ideology is still used as a primary objective 
of terrorists today. Although the DI / TII Kartosuwirjo was not listed as a terrorist 
organisation, it was given the spotlight whenever the issue of radicalism in Indonesia 
was discussed.146 The Darul Islam went on to produce several violent splinter 
groups, notably Jemaah Islamiyah, which will be discussed later. 
 
Another DI / TII group, which was led by Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, operated in 
South Sulawesi and was part of the DI / TII Kartosuwirjo.147 Muzakkar, a former 
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Lieutenant Colonel in the TNI, accepted Kartosuwirjo’s offer to become the chief of 
the TII’s fourth division in Sulawesi. The division was then named Divisi Hasanuddin, 
as Muzakkar did not want to use the name “TII” for his regiment. He preferred to 
employ the name, Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat (TKR), or the People’s Freedom 
Army. On 7 August 1953, Muzakkar declared that Sulawesi and the eastern region of 
Indonesia were willing to join the NII, and Muzakkar was made Deputy Minister of 
Defence NII.148 During his leadership in DI Sulawesi, he carried out some offensive 
activities against the government such as attacking the Indonesian army (TNI), the 
destruction of bridges and kidnapping Christian doctors and priests. The government 
of Indonesia countered the group by launching Operation ‘Tumpas’ and ‘Lighting’ to 
quell the rebellion of Muzakkar’s group. On 2 February 1965, Muzakkar was shot 
dead in an operation launched by the TNI.149 
 
In 1953, Daud Beureu’eh formed the DI/TII movement and Daud was very 
influential in Aceh. He supported the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and declared 
that the province and adjacent areas of Aceh as part of the NII. The group almost 
managed to control Aceh except for big cities such as Banda Aceh, Sigil, Langsa 
and Meulaboh, which remained under the firm grip of the Indonesian government. 
Part of the reason for the NII Aceh movement’s formation was Daud’s 
disappointment towards the Sukarno’s government for not fulfilling its promises to 
institutionalise the syariah law in Aceh after the war for independence. The 
insurgency in Aceh was resolved after special autonomy status was granted to Aceh 
on 26 May 1959 in the areas of religion, customs and education.  
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III. PKI’S RADICALISM: THE RISE OF ODER BARU (NEW ORDER) 
 
Radical movements that openly engaged in armed rebellion and terrorism 
tactics were prominent in the course of Indonesia’s history. They aimed at forming a 
separate state from the Republic of Indonesia. Slightly different from Sukarno’s era, 
the banishment of the Parti Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and the outlawing of the 
communist ideology, radical movements based on Islam started to appear. 
 
While the focus of this thesis is on Islamic radicalism, it is useful to examine 
the PKI against the backdrop of rising radicalism among Islamic organisations. All 
Islamic organisations viewed the PKI and communism as the common enemy of 
Islam and saw President Sukarno as the party’s main protector at the expense of 
other groups, Islam in particular.150 The PKI’s approach hinged on the dynamics of 
radical nationalism and it was an ideological party. The party was able to extend its 
appeal beyond a simple aliran context through its concerns for popular social and 
economic interests, especially to the Javanese abangan.151 Against the context of 
worsening economic situation in 1965, the PKI launched a campaign against the 
traditional elite and labelled them “corruptors and bureaucratic capitalists.”152 
Sukarno’s political concept of NASAKOM (acronym based on Nationalism, Religion, 
and Communism) was withering with the weakening support for communism. The 
PKI mounted several aggressive and violent protests in towns and villages with 
slogans and caricatures calling for the “crushing of the peoples’ enemies” and death 
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to the traditional elites.153 The elites quickly recognised that the PKI’s radicalism was 
more genuine that they had thought. In a bid for power, the PKI’s offensive against 
the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) culminated into a Coup d’état on 1 October 
1965 through the Gerakan 30 September (30th September Movement or G30S).154 
During the attempted coup, seven kidnapping teams formed by G30S abducted six 
military generals from their homes in the early hours, and momentarily laid claim to 
the country’s political centre. They were finally purged by General Suharto – who 
was not targeted during the coup - after assuming command of the Indonesian army 
in the absence of General Yani.155 According to Roosa, Suharto used the movement 
as a pretext for delegitimising Sukarno in what can be called a creeping coup d’état, 
that was disguised as an effort to prevent a coup.156 Muslim groups joined the fight 
against the communists, claiming it was their duty to cleanse Indonesia of 
atheism.157 Muslim organisations such as the NU had long been working with anti-
PKI army officers were mobilised by Suharto’s men to accuse the PKI of being 
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IV. VIOLENCE BY ISLAMISTS GROUPS DURING THE NEW ORDER 
 Hard-line Islamists groups started to form in the early 1970s and 1980s. They 
continued to campaign their aspirations to establish an Islamic state and 
institutionalising the syariah laws. The New Order government prohibited such 
groups and saw them as a threat. On the other hand, moderate Islamic groups were 
able solve the problems of pluralism in Indonesia and they supported and 
accommodated well to a society which is multicultural. 
  
One such extremist Islamic group during the New Order was the Komando 
Jihad. Komando Jihad’s existence lasted from the 1960s right up to the mid-1980s 
when the Indonesian intelligence unit clamped them down.159 Asep Warman and 
Imran Muhammad Zein led some of the famous cells of the Komando Jihad. The 
violence committed by the group include the bombing of Masjid Nurul Iman in 1976, 
and the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia airplane in 1981 with 57 passengers on 
board, in which they demanded the release of 20 political prisoners and the 
expulsion of the Yahudi (Jews) and the Israeli military from Indonesia.160 
 
 The short-term objective of the Komando Jihad group led by Warman was to 
crush communism and to form the Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia (Indonesian 
Council for Islamic Revolution). They protested fervently against the Pancasila and 
the 1945 constitution of Indonesia. During group’s active years, JI was formed out of 
a loose confederation of several Islamic groups. However, the group’s leaders, 
Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir were arrested during a crackdown on 
Komando Jihad. In 1979, the group led by Warman assassinated the Rector of 
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Universitas Sebelas Maret in Solo for exposing the existence of JI. Warman had also 
plotted to kill the judges and prosecutors who were handling the Haji Ismail Pranoto 
case.161 Warman’s group was also responsible for several robbery attempts 
including on a car carrying salaries of Sunan Kalijaga University in Jogjakarta and 
the Teachers’ Training College in Malang. Warman defended his robberies as fa’i, a 
concept used in Islam to legitimise wealth accumulation taken from enemies of Islam 
without waging a war. 
 On the other hand, the Komando Jihad group led by Imran was a 
fundamentalist Islamic group that was trained in Libya, Iran and Saudi Arabia in 
terrorism crafts and bomb making. Their terrorist acts included the attacks on police 
posts in Jakarta, Banding and Malang. It was formed in 1980 when the followers of 
Imran, who was an imam at the Istiqamah Mosque, pledged their bai’a to him. Imran 
was executed by the government when he was found guilty of masterminding the 
hijack of the Garuda Indonesia airplane in 1981.162 
 
 The Tanjong Priok massacre in September 1984 was another watershed 
incident in which the local Muslims clashed with the government. The incident was 
triggered by unhappiness over the actions of a local Christian military staff whose 
actions were deemed as disrespectful towards Islam.163 Two days after the incident, 
an Islamic cleric, Abdul Qadir Jaelani gave a sermon against Pancasila at the As-
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Saadah mosque.164 Thousands joined the protests led by Amir Biki, attacking the 
North Jakarta military command post and police headquarters.165  
 
It is also worth mentioning that some Muslim parties and organisations have 
created or revived their youth wings that have the potential to transform themselves 
into a radical organisation. One such group was the Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, which 
was formed under the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Although the Gerakan 
Pemuda Ka’bah was never categorised as an Islamic group, they committed several 
radical acts, such as raids on what they deemed immoral activities.166 They were 
also responsible for the bombing of Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta in 1984, as 
retaliation for the Tanjong Priok massacre.  
 
Currently still declared as active by the International Crisis Group, Angkatan 
Mujaheedin Islam Nusantara (AMIN) – a Darul Islam splinter group - was also 
vigorous in carrying out radical activities in the 1990s.167 The group was responsible 
for the bombing of Plaza Hayam Wuruk in Jakarta. The motive of the bombing was 
not religious in nature but it was deemed as a criminal act by the government.168 
They were also accused of bombing the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta in 1999. Although 
AMIN have been enthusiastic by more open-ended religious sentiments, they 
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defined their agendas in the context of Islamisation of Indonesia. According to the 
group, it is Jakarta’s secular orientation and willingness to embrace Western-led 
globalisation and capitalism actively, which is at the root of the country’s problems 
and, hence, the principal deviation needs to be “corrected.”169 
 
V. EXTREMIST ISLAMIC GROUPS DURING THE REFORMASI ERA 
 The proliferation of hard-line, militant, radical and fundamental Islamic groups 
was augmented by the wave of democratisation during the fall of the New Order. 
Several radical Muslims who had fled the country started to return home because 
they were no longer a political threat under the New Order government. The 
reformasi era also gave rise to extremist groups who championed issues along the 
lines of racial, political, human rights, democratisation, freedom of speech and press. 
It was perceived as a reaction towards several state policies that some 
Muslims saw as alienating.  The decade saw the rise of non-Muslim officers 
serving in both the civilian and military branches of the government.  This 
affected the career progression and scholarship opportunities of some 
Muslim officers.
170
  Other policies were also detested such as prohibition of 
wearing the tudung or jilbab (headscarf) in public schools.  Probably, the 
most controversial policy was the sole foundation (asas tunggal) 
requirement.
171
  Under this policy, every social and political organisation in 
the country should acknowledge Pancasila as its only foundation.  Many 
Muslims viewed this as a ruse of the government to decimate the chance in 
elections for opposition political parties, especially the Muslim-based United 
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Development Party (PPP), which at that point saw a steady rise of votes 




Other groups, which gained traction, include Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah 
Wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ), Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Majlis 
Mujaheedin Indonesia (MMI). They demanded the recognition of an Islamic state 
through Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution – on the belief in the One and 
Supreme God173 - and for the reinstatement of the famous seven words in the 
original Jakarta Charter, which was “the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its 
followers.”174 
 
Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ) and Laskar Jihad led 
by Jaafar Umar Thalib were formed in 1998 before the fall of the Suharto regime. 
The group’s dominant orientation of Islam was salafism and they adhered to the 
literal translation of the Quran and hadiths and out rightly rejected independent 
translation and traditional practices of Islam, which are culturally biased. FKAWJ 
runs a number of branches in Indonesia and its members ranged from college 
graduates to school dropouts.175 Laskar Jihad is FKAWJ’s military arm and Thalib 
himself managed it. The popularity of Laskar Jihad supersedes that of FKAWJ due to 
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its widespread media attention it had gotten. Some of its extremist activities include, 
sending its members to Maluku to participate in the sectarian conflicts between the 
Christians and Muslims. It also published a website to highlight the atrocities 
committed by the Christians in Maluku.176  
 
 Another hard-line group formed in 1998 by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab in 
Jakarta a few months after Suharto stepped down was Front Pembela Islam (FPI).177 
FPI was mooted by several ulamas, habibs, mubalighs and Muslim activists at 
Pondok Pesantren Al Um in Jakarta with the aim of upholding Islamic laws in a 
secular state. FPI’s ulamas and jemaahs used the group as a platform to work 
together, upholding the amar ma’ruf and nahi munkar (doing what has been told and 
staying away from what is forbidden) in their daily lives. Notoriously known for 
several radical acts since 1998, FPI positioned itself as a moral police and a 
pressure group working to eradicate immoral behaviours in society, which are 
against the syariah law. FPI targeted nightclubs, brothels, liberal Muslims, churches 
and embassies of countries that were considered by FPI as hostile towards Islam. 
One of FPI’s most significant actions was their presentation on the aspirations of the 
Indonesian people during Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) special assembly 
in November 1998 after the fall of Suharto.178 Some of FPI’s demands include: 1) the 
revocation of pancasila, 2) the removal of Indonesian military officers from the 
legislative and executive branch of the government, 3) accountability of former 
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president Suharto and an apology from GOLKAR (Golongan Karyawan, Party of 
Functional Groups) - the ruling political party during 1966-1998 under Suharto’s New 
Order regime - for the atrocities during the New Order, such as the occupation of 
East Timor. Most recently, FPI organised protests against the Miss World Contest 
2013 held in Bali, Indonesia.   
 
Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI), the paramilitary wing of FPI, was considered 
controversial due to its hard-line approach in warning Muslims who broke the Islamic 
laws. This was especially so during the fasting month of Ramadhan when they often 
resort to violence against Muslim who indulged in forbidden activities. The most 
prominent act of violence was the attack during the birthday celebration of Pancasila 
at the Monas (National Monument) in June 2008. They viciously beat up the 
participants of the event, including women and children with hard and blunt objects, 
destroying cars and public properties in the process.179 
 
Majelis Mujaheedin Indonesia (MMI) was a social Islamic organisation formed 
as a result of the Kongres Mujaheedin 1 Indonesia to uphold the syariah in 
Yogyakarta in August 2000. The congress produced the Yogyakarta Charter, which 
stated that the majority of Indonesians who are Muslims has the right and 
responsibility to uphold the syariah. According to MMI, the syariah was the solution 
to the political, social and humanitarian crisis in Indonesia. Thus, the MMI members 
have agreed on several initiatives such as, 1) rejecting ideologies that were deemed 
un-Islamic, 2) creating a strong camaraderie among mujaheedins domestically and 
internationally, and 3) to urge all Muslims to be active in da’wah and jihad in every 
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corner of the world. MMI also urge all Muslims to support the implementation of 
Islamic law and reject the concept of a secular state.180 
 
VI. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH 
 
Perhaps the most prominent and dangerous terrorist group today is Jemaah 
Islamiyah; the group forms the bulk of the terrorist inmate population in Indonesia. It 
is a militant organisation aimed at establishing an Islamic state within Southeast Asia 
and it is perceived to be a political-religiously driven terrorist group.181 The United 
States has declared JI a “forbidden corporation” according to intelligence sources; JI 
is a confederation of several Islamic groups.182 It has links with the notorious Al-
Qaedah organisation, and some JI members are Afghanistan alumni. Being an 
offshoot of the Darul Islam, JI is a conservative Islamic group, and the organisation’s 
pioneers were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. They were accused of 
masterminding the bombing of JW Marriot Hotel Jakarta in 2003. According to 
intelligence sources, it was believed that JI was sponsored and supported by other 
terrorist organisations such as the Abu Sayyaf group – a Philippines-based militant 
Islamist separatist group - and Al-Qaedah.183 Some of JI’s famous acts include the 
attack on several churches in major Indonesian cities in 2000, the bombing of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 and the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, and 
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even the planned bombing of Yishun MRT station in Singapore in 2001, which was 
foiled.  
 Similar to the previous groups mentioned, JI was active and systematic in 
the quest to establish Khilafah Islamiyah. Influenced heavily by salafism coupled with 
military skills, JI permitted the act of violence in jihad that was seen as a holy act. JI 
was silent, however, on allegations that they committed acts of terrorism and 
violence in the name of religion.184 Non-Muslims were regarded as second-class 
citizens without rights to hold office in government. JI also do not recognise gender 
equality; women were allowed to neither exercise any rights nor hold any office. Poor 
government administration and weak legislation during the early years of the 
Reformasi era has encouraged Islamic groups to pressure the government to 
enforce the syariah as the solution.185  
In summary, the rise of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia was 
influenced by a) the global radical Islamic movements based in the Middle East, 
which emerged as a reaction to the downfall of political Islam in the Middle East, b) 
the ideology of Western society which was secular and materialistic and other factors 
such as injustices suffered by Muslims in other countries. JI saw violent jihad as an 
effective method to mount an attack against the West and the former perceived the 
latter as their number one enemy. As a result, violence committed by radical Islamist 
groups such as JI, a stigma was developed among non-Muslims – especially in the 
West - to assimilate the Muslim identity to that of a terrorist or a militant. However, 
the development of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia needs to be viewed against the 
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backdrop of the socio-historical reality in a diverse country, so as not to pose a threat 
to the future of pluralism in Indonesia. Therefore, it is necessary to identify, map and 























  67 
 
CHAPTER 4: INDONESIA’S DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME 
I. INDONESIA’S DERADICALISATION EXPERIENCE 
As was mentioned earlier, the deradicalisation programme in Indonesia 
should generally be directed for radicals with the aim of reintegrating them into 
society and dissuading them from violence. The following paragraphs will illuminate 
the fact that deradicalisation in the form of religious counselling and re-education will 
not be as successful as other forms of tangible aids. 
The concept of deradicalisation is not new to Indonesia. In the context of 
radical Islamic movements, deradicalisation of the former NII, Komando Jihad,  
Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Tarbiyah, and movements in Poso, highlights some examples 
and learning points of how deradicalisation can be operationalised in the future.186 
Indonesia’s deradicalisation initiatives over the years had experienced successes 
and failures. Successes are shown by abandonment of violence by the members of 
the radical groups. There are no known sources to show how many participants of 
Indonesia’s past deradicalisation programmes – such as those initiated for Komando 
Jihad and in Poso – had abandoned extremism. However, from the many articles 
and books researched in this thesis, substantial number of participants had exploited 
the deradicalisation programme to consolidate their strengths, take advantage of its 
economic incentives or to escape rough treatment from the police. There are no 
specific data stating that there was any formal deradicalisation programme in 
Indonesia until 2003. The government had not declared any such programme at the 
national level before that. Since 2010, BNPT was appointed the coordinating agency 
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for a more systematic deradicalisation programme targeting terrorists.187 This 
includes the security apparatus, military, intelligence unit, other related ministries, 
religious leaders, and members of the public to implement a comprehensive counter-
terrorism strategy.188 BNPT took over from Densus 88 that ran the deradicalisation 
programme since 2003. What entails a “deradicalisation programme” for Indonesia? 
Does providing monetary awards and job training constitute deradicalisation or is 
religious counselling also part of the programme? Can family visits or providing free 
school fees for the inmates’ children alter their mindset to accept moderate views of 
Islam? The following few paragraphs present a cursory illustration of how 
deradicalisation programme has evolved in Indonesia.   
II. KOMANDO JIHAD: ECONOMIC INITIATIVES  
As a country that was subjected to terrorism and other violence in the course 
of its history, Indonesia had experience running the deradicalisation programmes 
that are approximately similar to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Singapore.189 Indonesia 
started its programme as early as the 1960s. Rehabilitating members of the 
Komando Jihad was one such example of how deradicalisation was initiated in 
Indonesia. The programme, which ran from 1962 to 1977, applied the economic 
empowerment approach.190 The New Order government offered a number of 
economic incentives to leaders and activists of DI / NII who pledged their allegiance 
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to the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). For example, for government provided 
transmigration incentives for its foot soldiers. The commanders were given jobs and 
start-up capital. A battalion commander, Ules Sudjadi, was employed as a Kodam 
Siliwangi (Komando Daerah Militer, or the Commando Territorial Command) staff 
and Ateng Djaelani and Adah Djaelani were commissioned as kerosene dealers in 
Bandung and Jakarta.191 
The deradicalisation programme was a success as it improved the economic 
well-being of its participants. Many ex-combatants abandoned their violent jihadi 
aspiration and ran their own businesses. Several former DI/NII activists benefited 
from the deradicalisation programme’s economic approach, such as providing 
employment. In 1968, Ateng Djaelani successfully became chairperson of 
Gapermigas PT (Joint Oil and Gas Company). The former activists took advantage 
of their strategic position and flexed their economic muscle to consolidate power 
among the rest of the DI/NII members. This was evident from various meetings 
organised such as Situ Aksan in 1971, which brought together thousands of DI/NII 
supporters.192 They also organised the meeting at Sigil in 1974 where they 
successfully rekindled the spirit of DI/NII to fight an open war against the Indonesian 
government.193 Thus, these deradicalisation efforts backlashed the government. 
From this failure, Komando Jihad was formed. The ideology of the DI/NII activists did 
not wither with the poverty and hardship that they experienced and the economic 
revitalisation of its members allowed them to reconsolidate their strengths. 
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III. LASKAR JIHAD: SELF-DERADICALISATION 
Indonesia’s deradicalisation efforts became “self-initiated” when the 
deradicalisation programme was actually carried out by the radical movements 
without them realising it. This happened to the radical group, Laskar Jihad, whose 
Islamic orientation was strictly salafism. The group waged a jihad in Maluku upon 
receiving a fatwa that it was wajib for them to fight in Maluku. The salafi ulamas who 
authorised the fatwa include Shaikh Muqbil bin Hâdi al-Wadîi from Yemen, Shaikh 
Râbi bin Hadi a-Madkholî from Mecca and Shaikh Abdul Mukhsin al-‘Abbad from 
Madinah.194 However, in a twist of events, the group halted their violence in Maluku 
in 2002 after Sheikh Robi’ bin Hadial-Madkhali, an ulama from Madinah, issued a 
fatwa for Laskar Jihad to be disbanded. Sheikh Robi’s fatwa was supported by three 
other salafi ulamas in Saudi Arabia. In the fatwa, he said, “I have come to know that 
the Indonesian government has devoted its attention to jihadism and defended its 
country well. As such, do not allow yourselves to continue jihad and plant this 
flag.”195 While Greg Fealy asserts that, the decline in funding had forced many 
Laskar Jihad’s members to leave the battlefields of Maluku and Poso and return to 
civilian life, John Sidel argued that an aggressive crackdown against armed Islamists 
groups had affected the morale of its members.196 Moreover, the Laskar Jihad had 
attracted national and international controversy over the stoning to death of one of its 
members who admitted to an adulterous relationship with an Ambonese woman. 
Thus, disengagement of its members developed due to lack of financial and logistical 
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support to engage governmental security forces, as well as a stained image of the 
organisation. Little is known if former Laskar Jihad’s members are ideologically 
deradicalised.197  
 
IV. DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME IN POSO 
 The deradicalisation programme initiated in Poso by the Indonesian 
government in 2007 was implemented after the armed conflict between JI activists 
and the police in Tanah Runtuh, Poso that claimed the lives of one policeman and 14 
jihadists in Poso.198 Badrodin Haiti, district chief of Suteng in Jakarta headed the 
deradicalisation programme. The programme focused on providing economic 
assistance to the combatants as well as vocational skills training. A successful case 
was Sofyan Djumpai alias Pian, an active member of the Mujaheedin Kayamanya 
convicted of firearms possession. Pian helped to recruit his former jihadist mates to 
take part in the programme. In July 2007, 16 former terrorists participated in 
automotive vocational training and furniture making.199 Upon completion, they were 
given monetary incentives and equipment for them to start their own business. The 
female ex-combatants as well as the wives of former terrorists programme also 
participated in the deradicalisation programme. They received training in baking and 
sewing. In 2008, 160 former terrorists participated in the programme and they 
successfully avoided acts of terrorism.200  
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Besides the police programme, the Pemuda Poso had its own deradicalisation 
programme, including an initiative to provide capital assistance for ex-combatants to 
start businesses. About 125 people received cash amounting to 10 million Rupiah (S 
$1100.00 [$1 = 9000 IDR].201 The ex-combatants were able to work on various 
development projects with the local government. For example, Pian received 
construction projects such as road improvements and building maintenance from the 
government. 
In addition, the Indonesian government initiated a deradicalisation programme 
that includes building a religious boarding school in the Tokorondo district in Poso. 
Touted as a “mega” pesantren project, the programme aims at keeping out teachings 
of radical Islam by implanting curricular subjects such as religious studies, Arabic 
and English.202 A prominent Muslim activist and local JI member, Ustaz Adnan Arsal, 
played a significant role in developing the pesantren. While he had disengaged from 
violence, he now remains a vocal speaker against the BNPT.203 One of his 
contentions with BNPT was his disagreement that Poso – where Adnan comes from 
- was branded as a haven for terrorists.204 Although Adnan is disengaged from 
committing violence, he is influential and charismatic enough to earn the support 
from his followers. Hence, BNPT may be waging a losing battle in its deradicalisation 
efforts in Poso if Adnan continues to discredit the government deradicalisation 
efforts. 
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V. CURRENT DERADICALISATION PROGRAMMES IN INDONESIA 
 As mentioned earlier, conceptually, the Indonesian government does not own 
any official deradicalisation programme. However, based on media reports and field 
research, the Indonesian police have initiated deradicalisation programmes by 
various “soft approaches” such as, communication and visits by family members, 
unconditional financial aid and soft loan for starting a business and prison facilities 
for terrorist inmates, such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The 
conduct of the soft approach relied on the mutual trust between prison wardens and 
inmates. 
The Indonesian government issued a regulation in 2010 formalising the 
establishment of a new National Anti-Terrorism Agency.205 The law tasks established 
the new agency with formulating policies and national programs, coordinating 
government offices concerned about its implementation and implementing policies in 
the field of anti-terrorism by setting up task forces with members from government 
offices in line with their respective tasks, functions, authorities.206 Hence, under the 
new regulation, the deradicalisation programme in Indonesia involves an array of 
government agencies at various levels and stages of the programme, but mainly 
operationalised by the prison wardens. The prison (pemasyarakatan) functions under 
the mandate of the Directorate General of Corrections (Direktorat Jenderal 
Pemasyarakatan). BNPT, which was known as the Coordination Desk 
for Eradication of Terrorism (Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme) in 2010, 
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introduced a blueprint and implemented a deradicalisation programme. Under the 
leadership of Brigadier General Suryadharma Salim, the programme includes an 
initiative to embrace terrorist inmates in a personal mentoring program.207 The 
programme is also part of another initiative by the National Police Bomb Task Force 
(Persatuan Tugas Bom Mabes Polri), which is the forerunner of Densus 88. Since 
2010, BNPT oversee and coordinate deradicalisation programme in Indonesia 
between government agencies. 
The programme is designed for the prison wardens (petugas 
pemasyarakatan) as the main implementers, and operationally supported by Densus 
88, BNPT officers, psychologists and the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Densus 88 
and the police carry out the investigations, arrests and interrogations. The wardens 
implement and monitor the terrorists’ daily activities and offer any assistance 
whenever the latter need it while in prison.208 The terrorists are supported financially 
in situations that require monetary assistance as long as their intentions to use the 
money are genuine and benign. MUI officers are supposed to play the role of 
counsellors and facilitators to alter the terrorists’ mindset concerning two 
fundamental issues: (a) killing of civilians and (b) the need of building and sustaining 
an Islamic state.209 However, it is pertinent to note that, most prisons have started to 
cease the use of state appointed ulamas, as the terrorists have more respect for 
former JI members because the state ulamas are regarded as failures who did not 
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establish the syariah in Indonesia.210 Former terrorists, such as Ali Imron and Nasir 
Abbas, are roped in to act as mentors or “interlocutors,” as they are considered 
success cases in the deradicalisation and disengagement process.211 Some terrorist 
inmates pay more attention to people like Abbas and Imron, and the former 
denounced violence after a series of counselling session with the latter. The former 
terrorists are also valuable because they provide information on strategies as well as 
tactics used by the terrorist groups.  
The programme developed from providing financial and capital assistance, 
organising thematic discussions, routine study and rapport building between inmates 
and wardens. Thus, technically, the main features of the programmes are not about 
religious counselling or re-education. Any form of ideological intervention has been 
less than successful and there is widespread resistance from the inmates, because 
in reality, inmates generally refuse to participate in any form of deradicalisation 
programme. However, there is also an effort to carry out a series of special 
discussion sessions aimed to deconstruct the extremists’ understanding of jihad. 
Critics, including community leaders, Muslim organisations and practitioners have 
argued that the mechanism of embracing these terrorists did not work well partly 
because the programme is regarded by most of the terrorist negatively and 
sceptically.212 The terrorists view it as a strategy to weaken and destroy their 
ideology. This partly explains why the percentage of successful deradicalisation 
program against terrorist prisoners is low.213  
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Another contributing factor to the effectiveness of the deradicalisation 
programme is the continued interaction by the police with the families of the 
prisoners and the communities within which the latter originate. The programme 
encourages the prisoners to move away from the terrorist violent ideologies by 
reminding them of the struggles and embarrassment faced by their family members. 
Families are encouraged frequent visits to the prison. Many have argued against 
these efforts because terrorists exploit such initiative to transfer the care of their 
family to the police. This makes it a community programme rather than individualised 
efforts to deradicalisation.214 “What the police are doing today is just cutting the tip of 
the iceberg. We nееd to find out why this guy is going back to the network. There 
must be a problem and a weakness,” asserted Tito Karnavian.215 
Therefore, in the framework of Indonesia’s past deradicalisation initiatives and 
the historical context that drove radicalisation, it is important to understand and 
identify the gaps and constraints that the government faces when running the 
programmes. This is important because, we are trying to understand why despite 
being incarcerated and involved in deradicalisation programmes and showing 
promising response, terrorist inmates returned to their old ways. The next section 
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VI. PRISON SYSTEMS IN INDONESIA 
 Indonesia’s first few convicted JI members were Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias 
Dani, a member of JI Johor Baru, and Edi Setiono alias Usman, an alumni of 
Afghanistan.216 That was also Indonesia’s first experience in dealing with JI terrorists 
in prison and handling a court case classified as “an act of terrorism.”217 They were 
sentenced to twenty years in prison for their roles in the bomb attack in August 2001, 
Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta and were sent to Cipinang Prison. Although there 
were previous bombing incidents during the post-Suharto period, such as the 
bombing of the Philippines embassy in Jakarta in 2000, the Christmas bombings in 
2000 and the bombing of Jakarta churches in May and June 2001, no arrests were 
made. However, accused terrorists were arrested during Suharto’s rule for incidents 
such as: 1) the hijack of Garuda Indonesia flight 206 by Komando Jihad in 1981, 2) 
bombing of Bank Central Asia in 1984 by Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, and 3) the 
bombing of Borobudur temple by a blind Islamic preacher in 1985. No known 
deradicalisation programme was carried out for the aforementioned perpetrators. It is 
also pertinent to note that no jurisdiction clause was provisioned for terrorism cases 
in 2001. Indonesia adopted its Anti-terrorism Law in 2002, which was approved by 
former president Megawati, six days after the Bali bombings took place.218 
 When Cipinang prison received the first convicted Islamists terrorist inmates, 
Dani and Usman, it did not have any specific rules and regulation concerning the 
treatment of these terrorists. They were housed in the same cells with the rest of the 
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prisoners and there were no limits imposed on their interaction with the rest of the 
inmates as well as the outside world. They were allowed visits two to three times a 
month and there was no restriction during the visits. Family members were allowed 
to bring any necessities for the inmates.219 
 The absence of special regulations in dealing with convicted terrorist 
accentuates the inexperience of Indonesian prisons with regards to curbing 
radicalisation and imposing deradicalisation programmes.220 Bayu and several BNPT 
officials recounted to me that convicted terrorists are highly respected in prisons, as 
they were regarded as a brave, religious warrior and dangerous because they were 
knowledgeable and have demonstrated their ability to carry out bombings.  
 Following the Bali bombing in 2002, dozens of suspects were arrested and 
jailed, including Imam Samudra alias Abdul Aziz, Amrozy, Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas 
and Ali Imron alias Alik. They were placed in Kerobokan prison in Denpasar, Bali. 
The captivity of the Bali bombers marked the beginning of confusion and 
disorientated approach of handling convicted terrorists. Although the Bali bombers 
were placed in isolated cells, communication was possible by shouting to one 
another.221 The enforcement of restricted communication was short-lived and in 
2003, a special prison block was provisioned for terrorists and slowly, the terrorists 
begun to have more flexibility to communicate and interact.  
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a. COMMUNICATION ACCESS 
The pivotal point occurred was when Imam Samudra began to communicate 
with the JI network using the internet inside the Denpasar prison.222 This was widely 
reported in the media and was dubbed as an outstanding failure of the Indonesian 
government in managing terrorist inmates. Agung Setyadi, a university lecturer from 
Semarang, sent a laptop to Beni Irawan, a prison worker assigned to the terrorist 
inmates’ cellblock and Beni gave the laptop to Samudra.223 Beni’s acquaintance with 
Samudra started through socialising with the latter and both often held discussions 
on religious matters. Beni was even requested by the terrorists to perform the adzan 
in the terrorists’ cellblock during the mandatory prayer sessions termed as solat 
fardhu.224 Interaction between inmates and wardens became more frequent and 
were unregulated. Thus, the social interaction between wardens and the terrorists 
backfired and, moreover, wardens at that time were not trained to manage terrorist 
inmates professionally.  
 There was also an abuse of communication access committed by Mukhlas 
when he was discovered giving sermons and lectures through teleconferencing to an 
audience outside of prison. There was a congregation of Muslims in a mosque in 
Solo, listening attentively to Mukhlas when he was broadcasting his lectures using a 
laptop from prison.225 In 2005, the inmates were given limited communication access 
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after an officer discovered Mukhlas’s use of teleconferencing to spread JI’s ideology 
and to disseminate instructions. 
The main concerns of the prison authorities in the early 2000s with regards to 
terrorists inmates was the lack of prison space and the free interaction between 
terrorists and non-terrorists inmates. This is especially so in Cipinang prison, which 
housed JI heavyweights such as Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abu Rusydan, Abu Tholut and 
Urwah. Since 2010, a separate cellblock was created to house convicted terrorists. 
In addition, prior to 2008, inmates were allowed frequent visits by family members 
and friends. This concession allowed them to obtain basic necessities, handphones, 
jihadist-themed books and scriptures from visitors. Such privilege enjoyed by the 
inmates was seen as jeopardizing efforts to implement any deradicalisation 
programme in prisons.  
b. PESANTREN AT-TAWWABIN 
 Perhaps the most glaring mistake made by prison authorities that hampered 
deradicalisation efforts was the provision given to set up an informal “pesantren” At-
Tawwabin in Cipinang.226 The inmates carried out activities such as religious 
classes, Quran reading and tafsiran. Abu Tholout once served as the mudir or school 
principal at the pesantren from 2005 to 2006. It was estimated that the pesantren 
was attended by some 300 non-terrorists inmates.227 After the mandatory Friday 
congregational prayers, terrorist inmates had the freedom to converge and have a 
meal together. It was discovered in 2007 that some JI inmates exploited this privilege 
to carry out proselytisation among non-terrorists inmates as well as to reinforce their 
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violent jihadist ideology. While At-Tawwabin (which means, ‘those who repent’) was 
originally set-up as a religious facility, the misuse made by JI members to imbibe  the 
general inmate population with jihadists aspirations prompted the government to shut 
it down in 2007. Activities among terrorist inmates were more restricted since then 
and the authorities managed to curb several JI members from infiltrating pesantren 
At-Tawwabin. However, from frequent attendance at At-Tawwabin, some non-
terrorists inmates had begun to assimilate the jihadist culture from charismatic JI 
individuals who embody the ideology of JI in the form of violent jihadism. They are 
attracted to the latter’s interpretation of Islam, behavioural norms and their anti-
western and anti-establishment perspective.228 Such phenomenon had certainly 
forced the government to revamp their ideological strategy, and even more so, when 
it was discovered that many “normal” inmates including youths and the elderly had 
volunteered themselves to serve as santri, be it as imams, befrienders or tukang 
adzan at At-Tawwabin. 
 BNPT had revealed that the establishment of pesantren At Tawwabin was 
actually part of the design for the “deradicalisation” programme. The pesantren was 
to be closely monitored by the prison authorities to propagate moderate Muslim 
views and to encourage positive religious activities among inmates. BNPT was 
surprised why the JI members were active in the pesantren as some of the informal 
classes and da’wah there did not fit their ideology. Yunanto gave several possible 
reasons. Firstly, JI members had arranged to exploit At-Tawwabin as a platform to 
springboard their ideology, to recruit new members and to gain sympathy from the 
general inmate population. Secondly, they wanted to score points for good behaviour 
to gain attention from prison authorities, hoping that they will note the former’s 
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positive religious activities in the pesantren, to be included in the consideration for 
remission and early release.229  
c. JIHADIST WAY OF LIFE 
 Terrorist inmates such as Sunata and Abu Tholut, who are more appealing, 
were able to radiate their jihadist culture and attract other inmates. What constitutes 
these “jihadist way of life”? Some of the mandatory religious duties such as praying 
five times a day, fasting and Quran recital were consistently observed. Besides the 
fardhu praying times, the terrorists also performed the solat sunnah which includes 
solat dhuha, tahajud and qiyamulail.230 These prayers are actively performed in a 
congregation. In addition to the mandatory fasting during the month of Ramadhan, 
they also fasted on Mondays and Thursdays, a common practice among Muslims. 
The terrorist inmates also actively perform the puasa Daud, which is fasting during 
alternate days, emulating the practice of Prophet Daud.231 These religious habits are 
commonly observed among Muslims of all backgrounds; none is “extreme” in nature.  
However, indoctrination occurs subtly during religious classes or taklim 
sessions. When these sessions are attended by non-terrorists inmates, the sessions 
will be based on general Islamic concepts such as fardhu ain, tauhid and aqidah. 
These discussions will progress to topics relating to jihad, especially, when most of 
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the participants in attendance are terrorist inmates.232 Being able to perform these 
religious duties, especially in a jemaah, allows the terrorists inmates to be in a 
constant state of istiqomah, and to reinforce their desire to perform jihad even under 
restricted conditions in detention. Hence, an image of a pious Muslim will crystallise 
in the mind of the audience and becomes attractive among hardcore criminals, drug 
addicts and youths. They turn to the more influential JI members in prison to register 
their remorse and become more active in performing their Islamic duties. 
Inadvertently, some JI members assume the role of counsellors and this result in 
other non-terrorists inmates to become susceptible to recruitment into the terrorist 
network. Some of the more chilling ideas shared by the terrorists are as follows: 
“Jika ahli keluraga kita mati di dalam pengeboman terhadap para musuh 
Islam, maka mereka akan masuk syurga (Even if our family members died in the 
bombings, heaven is promised for them)”  
    Interview with Urwah by prison wardens.  
 ““Walaupun negara melarang, kalau syariat Islam mengizinkan, ya tidak 
masalah … Kalau tindakan kekerasan sebagai hukuman atas kesalahan dilakukan 
Nabi, bisa diterapkan sekarang  (Even if state law forbids it, violence in the name of 
Islam is allowed … If the prophet allows it, we can apply it today.”  
Son Hadi, spokesperson for Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), September 2012. 
 In addition to religious practices, the terrorists used other daily recreational 
activities in prison to buttress their jihadist commitments. While these activities are 
usually left unmonitored, they became an avenue for the terrorists to spread 
extremist ideologies. For example, simple recreational activities like watching 
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television, DVDs, films, interaction during sports activities and reading books are 
abused, as the terrorists are constantly looking for ways to find loopholes in the 
system. They watch videos and read books that cast violent jihad in a positive light, 
such as those made by Anwar Al-Awlaki and Abu Bakar Baasyir.233 These materials 
are obtained from visitors and are also widely available in the internet through 
websites such as YouTube or sent to them via email. The jihadi-themed materials 
became widely consumed, especially among the younger inmates, and they are 
made even more attractive by the JI members, such as by making a rap video to 
spread the positive message of armed jihad.234 
d. MINI BUSINESS 
The provision to allow inmates to run a mini trade in prison allows 
unrestrained interaction among the general inmate population, as well as opportunity 
for the terrorists to fuel their desire for jihad. Even in prison, terrorists were able to 
strengthen their camaraderie by providing monetary support to their fellow terrorists 
who were held in Batu, Nusakambungan prison in Central Java.235 In order to enable 
them to support their family back home and to provide meaningful activities to 
inmates, Cipinang prison allowed inmates to run a mini trade in prison. This allowed 
terrorist inmates to accumulate wealth from selling handphone prepaid cards, food, 
and basic necessities to other inmates.  
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A popular item which is sold includes the gamis (a Pakistani long-sleeved 
dress or a shirt), and wearing it symbolises a form of identity for the santri. Other 
inmates called terrorists who indulged in these businesses as para ikhwan as a sign 
of respect.236 Some of these businesses became profitable and thus, the terrorists 
were able to send money to their family as well as other comrades to aid their 
mission to perform the jihad.  
 While the preceding section highlights the problems associated with the 
Indonesian prisons in managing the inmates, the following two sections describe 
some of the shortcomings in the post-release phase that hamper the deradicalisation 
effort. 
e. WEAK INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION 
There is a lack of synchronisation among the various security agencies in 
handling and managing terrorist inmates from the time of arrests and release from 
prison. The lack of training received by prison wardens amplifies the problem. There 
have been calls for a better integration among BNPT, the Directorate of Corrections 
and the police to share vital information and to implement aftercare programmes. 
This weak coordination among agencies prompts Sidney Jones to call for a 
strengthening of capacity of relevant agencies.237 While Singh describes Indonesia 
as a classic case of a weak state and society, he acknowledges the commendable 
effort by Indonesia’s security agencies in dealing and eradicating the menace of 
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terrorism.238 However, the on-going rivalry for resources among government 
agencies negatively impacts counter-terrorism efforts and thus, delaying any 
responses. Furthermore, Indonesia’s Directorate of Corrections has not made any 
significant commitments to get directly involved in the deradicalisation efforts. This is 
unfortunate because the deradicalisation process breaks down when terrorists are 
released from prison. Moreover, interaction with the authorities in prison and police 
often ends up with an interrogation session to extract information from the convicted 
terrorists. Weak coordination among agencies also disrupts the effort to develop a 
personalised relationship. Trust and rapport built during interrogation is lost to the 
police until the terrorist goes to prison and the prison wardens take over. Due to an 
absence of continuity to build a relationship with the terrorist, prison officials bear the 
burden of trying to continue building rapport, only to discover that they will not be 
able to sustain the rapport once the terrorists are released back into the community. 
f. WEAK FOLLOW-UPS 
To date, there are no formal post-prison programmes run by the government. 
The weak follow-up actions by The Ministry of Social Affairs do not facilitate nor 
monitor the reintegration of terrorist back into society. The police or BNPT are 
assumed to shoulder the responsibility. Therefore, opportunity is lost for an active 
effort to reintegrate terrorist back into society. As a result, former terrorists will turn to 
their old network for social, emotional and economic support.  
Furthermore, individuals or organisations that run their own deradicalisation 
programmes lack of support and recognition. One such individual is Sarlito Wirawan, 
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who advocates moderate Islamic teachings. In his efforts, he tries to weave in 
deradicalisation with his academic research and applies it to the released terrorist. 
The programme attempts to connect religious leaders with terrorists in prison and 
those recently released, in an effort to instil moderate understanding of jihad, using 
the definition put forth by the Centre for Islamic Studies239 – jihad is defined as 
“struggle” or striving, taking place at two levels: “inner” and “outer”. While outer jihad 
refers to the defence of the Muslim community under attack, inner jihad refers to all 
the struggles that a Muslim may go through, in adhering to the religion - as his main 
materials.240  
 
VII. THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS  
BNPT has called for the cooperation between authorities and civil society in 
ensuring the success of post-release deradicalisation programme. BNPT maintained 
that it can only facilitate, falling short of being the enforcers of deradicalisation 
programmes. Muhammadiyah and Nadhatul Ulama have not been formally involved 
in the state’s deradicalisation programme, although some Muhammadiyah members 
used to be involved in Indonesia counter-terrorism efforts. Indonesia's two largest 
Islamic social organisations have also shied away from directly participating in or 
pledging support for the BNPT’s deradicalisation efforts.241 The leaders of the 
organisations have maintained that they would work with former terrorists if that work 
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were a part of their normal activities. Hence, further efforts must be made by the 
state to work with these key Muslim organisations on deradicalisation in an effort to 
reintegrate the terrorists into mainstream Muslim communities. However, the role of 
civil society should not be one that involves religious rehabilitation, but one that takes 
a humanitarian approach. Besides providing moral and psychological support, civil 
society organisation such as Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (Institute for 
International Peace Building) could open up new social networks for former 
terrorists, encourage economic independence or at the very least, provide their 
clients with a bit of respect and dignity.242 This will not only encourage 
disengagement, but it will minimise the resistance of the former terrorists to accept 
changes in their lifestyle. 
VIII. INDONЕSIAN DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME: A TRIUMPH? 
Indonesia has not released any concrete data to measure the success of the 
deradicalisation programme in prison and an accurate prediction is not possible.243 
Since the 1990s, JI, an offshoot of Darul Islam, took the lead in almost all terrorist 
related incidents and they form the bulk of the terrorist inmate population.  
From 2000 to 2010, approximately 600 convicted terrorists were held in prison 
and about 100 of these individuals were involved in the Aceh military training camp, 
as either trainers or participants.244 From 2002 to April 2013, approximately 800 
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arrests were made and 63 of these were shot dead in shootouts with Densus 88.245 
As of 2013, Indonesia has at least 28 known recidivists terrorists out of around 300-
350 convicts released, or about 10% rate of recidivism.246 While the figures seem 
low, the rate of recidivism could be slightly higher with undiscovered recidivists and 
suspected terrorists who were acquitted without charge and later went on to commit 
terrorist acts. This would include Qomarudin alias Mustaqim and Rachmat Puji 
Prabowo who were both ex-JI members arrested in 2004 for sheltering Noordin Top. 
Upon the acquittal of Qomarudin and Rachmat, they went on to join the Aceh 
camp.247 It also excludes men who re-engaged in terrorism after their release but in 
a way that did not violate any law; several of the Poso combatants who were 
arrested in 2007 and then joined the local JAT would fall in this category. 
 
In one article, BNPT asserted that 13% of those released in 2010 returned to 
terrorist activities.248 According to Ansyaad Mbai, BNPT chief, these terrorists had 
taken part in some form of deradicalisation programme in prison. In the same year, 
170 terrorists were arrested and 22 of them were recidivists.249 However, Carl 
Ungerer from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimated that as many as 30% 
of those who were convicted are vulnerable and not susceptible to the 
deradicalisation programme.250 IPAC estimated that over 80 terrorists will be due for 
release in 2013 and 2014, and these terrorists will bear the testament on the 
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effectiveness of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme.251 It is difficult to ascertain 
whether a former dеtainее is fully rehabilitated, or is simply practicing the jihadi 
principle of takеyya in which disinformation and deception are justified if their well-
being or Islam is thrеatеnеd. The еffеctivеnеss of the programme remains an open 
question.  
 
Table 1 shows a partial list of recidivist terrorists, compiled from various 
sources such academic literature, online articles and fieldwork. The information 
below serves to highlight that not only the terrorist returned to their old networks, but 
they also resumed acts of violence. Moreover, most of these convicts had 
participated in the deradicalisation programme and it begs the question whether the 
government had done enough to evaluate their potential for release. The next 
section shall explore five of these case studies. Selection of these cases is due to 
the information available at the time of research and lack of information on the rest of 
the recidivists. However, the analysis will not explore prominent cases such as Abu 
Bakar Baasyir and Aman Abdurrahman as extensive coverage in the media on them 
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TABLE 1: LIST OF RECIDIVIST TERRORISTS252 







1.  Abdullah 
Sunata  
 
Possession of firearms 
and sheltering Noordin 
Top. Orchestrated Bali 
bombings. 
 
In May 2006, the 
District Court in South 
Jakarta sentenced 











in Aceh and 
the plan to 
attack the 
Presidential 






2.  Abu Bakar 
Baasyir 
Amir of Jemaah 
Islamiyah. 
Masterminded several 
key bombings such as 
Bali Bomb 1.  
In 2003, sentenced to 4 
years imprisonment. 
Released in 2006 for 





ran a training 









bombing of Cimanggis 
in 2004. Sentenced to 7 
years imprisonment. 
























bin Nasim  
 
Involved in the bombing 
of Senen Atrium 2001. 
Also involved in 
Cimanggis bombing. 
Sentenced to 5 years 
imprisonment. 







camp in Aceh 
In 2011, 
sentenced to 
9 years in jail. 




Noordin Top.  Involved 
in Australian Embassy 
Went through 
rehabilitation 




Shot dead in 
Bekasi, 
August 2009. 
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bombing. In 2004, 
Sentenced to 5 years 
imprisonment.  
6.  Bagus Budi 
Pranoto 




Sentenced in 2004 to 4 
years imprisonment. 
Released in 2007 for 






narrative while in 
prison. However, 
later gave in and 
cooperated with 
police. 
Wanted by the 
police in 2009 
for his 
connection 














and Umar Patek. In 
2006 sentenced to 6 
years imprisonment. 
Released in 2008. 







Shot dead in 
Aceh, March 
2009. 
8.  Fadli 
Sadama 
Involved in a robbery at 






for good behaviour 
Sheltered 
Urwah and 
involved in a 
robbery at 








9.  Luthfi 
Haedaroh 
alias Ubeid  
Collaborated with 
Noordin Top. 
Sentenced to 4 years 
imprisonment. 









10 years in 
jail 
10.  Heri Sigu 
Samboja 
alias Soghir  
 
Assembled bomb which 
exploded outside 
Australian embassy in 
Jakarta. Sentenced to 7 
years imprisonment in 













8 years in jail. 
11.  Rahmat 
Puji 
Prabowo 




Sentenced in 2004 for 7 
and a half years 
imprisonment. 















12.  Mustofa 
alias Abu 
Took part in the 
bombing of the Atrium 
Put through a 
deradicalisation 
Alleged 
member of the 
In 2011, 
sentenced to 
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Tholut  shopping mall in 
Central Jakarta in 2001 
and was found guilty of 
possessing illegal 
ammunition and 
explosives in 2003. He 
was sentenced to 7 
years in prison in 2004 
but received a reduced 
sentence in 2007.  
programme in 








13.  Suryadi 
Masood 
alias Umar  
Bombed MacDonald’s 
restaurant in Makassar, 
October 2002. 
Sentenced to 8 years 
imprisonment. 



















from police regarding 
the group led by Subur 
Sugianto. In 2006, 
sentenced to 6 years 
imprisonment. 
Put through a post-
release 
rehabilitation 
program by Noor 
Huda. Re-








8 years jail. 







bombers, Mukhlas. In 
2003, sentenced to 
three half years 
imprisonment. 
Released in 2005 for 
good behaviour. 
Showed good 
behaviour in prison 
and cooperated 
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IX. COMMENTS ON RECIDIVISM 
 
BNPT and the Indonesian government have used the term “recidivists” loosely. It 
is clear that recidivist refers to repeat offenders or those who returned to commit 
terrorism acts. However, it is unclear whether these recidivists participated in any 
deradicalisation programme. For example, the Indonesian police have labelled the 
convicted terrorists in Table 1 as recidivists. Must a repeat offender go through the 
deradicalisation programme to be labelled as recidivist, or is imprisonment enough 
as criteria? A check on the U.S. Justice Department on the definition of “recidivism” 
yields the following: 
“Recidivism is measured by criminal acts that resulted in re-arrest, re-
conviction, or return to prison with or without new sentence during a three-
year period following the prisoner’s release.”253 
 
 The abovementioned definition uses previous convictions rather than arrest 
for calculation, the recidivism rate for Indonesia would be hovering at just below 
10%, including those who were shot dead at the time of arrests.254 At the time of 
research for this thesis, no data was available to ascertain the “window period” used 
by the Indonesian government in order to categorise terrorists as recidivists. 
However, if the definition holds, statistics might be skewed as the calculation 
excludes other terrorist, which falls outside the range. These include those who were 
caught beyond the three-year window, those who radicalised or support terrorist acts 
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but did not commit anything against the law and those who were caught but released 
without sentence.  
While the definition should not apply to Islamist terrorists because the aim of 
deradicalisation should be to prevent released terrorists from re-engaging in 
terrorism and violence, the rehabilitation of these terrorists should be permanent. 
Ideally, the process should encourage terrorists to embrace moderate Islamic 
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES 
I. IMRON BAIHAQI ALIAS ABU THOLUT 
 Imron Baihaqi alias Abu Tholut is labelled as “Indonesia’s top terrorist” by the 
various local media.255 He was accused of taking part in the bombing of the Atrium 
Shopping Mall in central Jakarta in 2001 as well as possessing ammunition and 
explosives. In 2004, he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment but was 
released in 2007 as he displayed positive response during the deradicalisation 
programme in Depok prison. In 2011, he was re-arrested on terrorism charges and 
sentenced to eight years imprisonment. He was believed to have reconnected with 
the terrorist network and became a member of the Tanzim Al-Qaedah in Aceh where 
he participated in the training and supplied weapons. Tholut was also previously 
trained in Afghanistan and participated in a militant camp in Mindanao in the 
Philippines.256  
 Abu Tholout is known to be a “good person” and friendly among his 
neighbours in the village Desa Bae, Kudus.257 Although the name Abu Tholut had 
become synonymous with terrorist activities before his arrival, the villagers at Bae 
accepted him as a warm and friendly person. Tholut did not portray himself as an 
extremist. Some villagers even believed that he was not really a terrorist, although 
they knew he had just been released from prison.258 Tholut is affectionately called 
“Om Yon”, a short form for Uncle Imron.259 His family is also very sociable with the 
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villagers and his wife, Fachatun, is active in community activities. When interviewed, 
the villagers admitted that they did not know of Tholut’s activities outside the village, 
even though he and his family interacted well in the village. He was also known as 
Pak Ustaz as he was active in giving sermons and carrying out religious classes 
outside the village. Bayu and Narendra believed that Tholut earned some income by 
conducting religious classes and syarahan outside the village.260 Tholut rarely 
preached in the village as his religious orientation of Islam differed from that of the 
villagers. 
 Tholut was once among several convicted terrorists enrolled in the police’s 
deradicalisation program while in prison, but he is a confirmed recidivist by the 
intelligence branch.261 Bayu and Ansyaad believed that the sentence was 
inadequate for someone with Tholut’s proficiency unless the government managed 
to pierce through Tholut’s network deeper and deradicalise his followers. 262 Tholut 
could potentially build a new network of terrorist cells if the government is not 
responsive as he was regarded as a pious and brave man among the other inmates. 
While in prison, he headed pesantren At Tawwabin. While reports have emerged 
that he is shunned by Abu Rusydan’s factions, he is well liked by supporters of 
Noordin Top and other splinter groups.263  
 In an interview with BNPT in 2010, Abu Bakar Baasyir revealed that Abu 
Tholut was a respected teacher in Pondok Pesantren Ngruki (Baasyir’s boarding 
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school) and he taught Asyakari.264 Baasyir admitted that he was emotionally linked to 
Tholut as a fellow ustaz. In the interview, Baasyir vividly mentioned: 
 “Saya dan Tholut sepakat untuk berjihad melalui jalur pendidikan dan 
berda’wah tanpa kekerasan. Kami akan melawan jika diserang. Saya yakin Tholut 
tidak akan menyetujui cara jihad yang dilakukan mereka-mereka yang di Aceh. (We 
pledge to jihad in with the path of education and da’wah without violence. We will 
retaliate only if we are attacked. Tholut would never agree with how jihad is 
conducted by those in Aceh.)”265 
 The interview highlights the deep-seated affinity among JI members, which 
cannot be easily broken. 
II. BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO ALIAS URWAH 
 In 2004, Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah was arrested for sheltering Azahari 
and Noordin Top, the masterminds of the JW Marriot bombing in Jakarta in 2003. 
The following year, the South Jakarta District court sentenced Urwah to prison for 
three and half years. He was jailed in the Cipinang prison, a top-security prison in 
Jakarta. While he initially refused participation, he eventually gave in for practical 
reasons. Ansyaad Mbai noted that Urwah, like other terrorists who were desperate to 
be released, showed remorse and made convincing promises to the police relating to 
abandoning violence. He cooperated with the police and gave valuable information 
about several key figures in JI. Urwah was released from prison in late 2007 and was 
later shot dead during an arrest in 2009. While in prison, he interacted a lot with the 
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“JI Putih” (white JI) and regularly visited them in their cells every week.266 This 
“white” group persistently reject any form of deradicalisation programme and they 
refuse any assistance from the wardens.  
 Urwah was exposed to radicalism while attending a local public school and he 
had good connections in the terrorist network. Born in 1978, Urwah came from the 
village of Mijen in the district of Kaliwungu, Kudus regency and his family members 
were mostly basket weavers. Although the villagers were aware of Urwah’s terrorist 
activities, they were still friendly towards Urwah’s family and Urwah himself was 
known to the villagers as a polite young man who was diligent in his religious duties. 
Bayu also mentioned that villagers had no problem attending Friday congregational 
prayers with Urwah after his release from prison. Urwah graduated from Pesantren 
Al-Muttaqein in Jepara. He then continued his education in Ma’had Aly An-Nur in 
Solo.267 It was in An-Nur that Urwah started to participate in terrorist activities upon 
meeting with Islamic radicals. One of his teachers in An-Nur was Syaifuddin Umar, 
alias Abu Fida, who was also arrested and considered a key link to senior JI 
members, most importantly Azahari.268 Abu Fida introduced Urwah and another of 
his classmate, Ubeid, to Noordin Top. Upon his release from prison, Urwah 
maintained good relationships with his former classmates such as Ubeid and other 
known radicals.  
 Urwah resided in Surakarta, in the village of Padokan, Sukoharjo after his 
release. His routine work included downloading jihadi documentaries and films from 
YouTube and copied them onto storage media for mass dissemination under the 
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name of Muqowama Publications. He produced several jihad documentaries such as 
Para Peminang Bidadari (The Fairy Proposals), Daulah Islamiyah Iraq (The Islamic 
State of Iraq) and The United States of Losers.269 Urwah regularly received 
invitations to give lectures in Surakarta and Yogyakarta, and he was a regular imam 
who led the fardhu prayers in mosques. His ardent followers included housewives, 
young adults and teenagers.270 One of Urwah’s teachings in these mosques 
reiterated the fact that jihad is fardhu ain, and therefore it is legitimate for anyone to 
execute it based on whatever initiatives and methods. Urwah, like other JI members, 
argued that performing jihad does not require the permission of an imam.271 
My interview with BNPT officials and Noor Huda revealed some disturbing 
facts; villagers who patronise mosques utilised by JI members especially in Central 
Java, regarded convicted terrorists as defenders of Islam, to the extent that they 
visited these terrorists in prison as a form of solidarity among Muslims.272 One of the 
visitors in prison told Noor Huda that, “We have to remain united as mujahid to fight 
against the enemies of Islam.” These kinds of support enable detainees to maintain 
their spirit of jihad. Furthermore, it reinforces a mentality that they are still living 
within mujahid groups even when they are in prison. Urwah mentioned to Huda that 
                                                          
269
 As of March 2012, these videos were still available in YouTube.com. The original uploaded videos have been 
deleted. They were re-uploaded by one user, ‘uno iguane’ earlier in 2013 and garnered less than 50 views up 
until June 2013. 
270
 Interview with Bayu Adinugroho, Jakarta, October 2013.  
271
 This is a radical understanding of jihad in the modern context. A famous quote often used (or misused) was 
by Ibnu Rusyid, “Obedience to the imam is mandatory even though the he is unfair - even though he is fasiq - 
unless he gives orders to commit adultery, which include preventing one from performing jihad, which is 
fardhu ain.” He said it in the context of Muslims being attacked in physical sense (war). See books by Rohimin, 
in Jihad: Makna dan Hikmah, Erlangga, 2006, pp. 6-13. Also, Mohd Liki Hamid, in Pengajian Tamadun Islam, 
PTS Professional, pp. 130-140. 
272
 Some examples of these mosque which are often used as a place for gatherings and sermons of JI members 
include, Ramadhan Mosque in Bekasi, Al-Muttaqien Mosque in Kartopuran, Al-Islam Gumuk Mosque in Solo, 
Al-Maghfiroh Mosque in Cimanggis and Pesantren Jamsaren Mosque in Surakarta. This information was 
quoted from an operation conducted by Densus 88 in intelligence gathering to find out the extent of the 
spread of radicalism in mosques in 2010. 
  101 
 
as mujahids, they always have to protect their image and their principles on their 
views on jihad. 
III. ABDULLAH SUNATA 
While Abdullah Sunata was touted as a success case in Indonesia’s 
deradicalisation programme, he became a prominent recidivist when he was 
accused of masterminding a terrorist training camp in Aceh and planned to attack the 
Presidential Palace on 17 August 2010.273 During the programme, he claimed to 
renounce the use of violence in Jihad. According to Nasir Abbas, as a member of 
NII, he reignited his radical aspirations and joined forces with Kompak (Crisis 
Management Committee) which operated during the crisis in Ambon.274 Sunata also 
played a critical role within the JI network after the death of Noordin Top.275 After the 
Bali bombings, he opened a training camp in Mindanao and was believed to receive 
funds from the Middle East. Within the military leadership structure of JI, Sunata was 
known to be in the ranks of Dulmatin and Umar Patek.276 Sunata was arrested on 2 
July 2005 for possession of firearms and for sheltering Noordin, the late bomb-
making expert who orchestrated all of the major suicide bombings targeting 
Westerners in Indonesia, including the Bali nightclub blasts. In May 2006, the District 
Court in south Jakarta sentenced Sunata to seven years imprisonment. He was 
released from prison almost three years later in 2009 for cooperating with the police, 
displaying good behaviour as well as changing his perception towards violence. He 
was re-arrested in June 2010 for his alleged involvement in a plot to carry out a 
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Mumbai-style attack targeting foreigners in luxury hotels and several high-profile 
assassinations. 
Sunata was born in Bambu Apus in eastern Jakarta on 4 October 1978. 
Bearing his real name, Abu Ikrimah Al Bassam Al Mathlub, he became famous when 
he commanded the Laskar Mujaheedin Kompak in Ambon. According to Ansyaad, 
Sunata was deemed as an exemplary subject in the deradicalisation programme. He 
proved that even hardened criminals could change.277  
Noor Huda Ismail, who is the Executive Director of Yayasan Prasasti 
Perdamaian, claimed that Sunata was a nice and accommodative person while in 
prison. He was receptive towards the rehabilitation programme and cooperated well 
with the police. During one of the routine dialogue session with his case officers, 
Bayu asserted that Sunata was remorseful for his deeds and rejected the act of 
martyrdom and suicide bombing.278 He did not support any attack in Jakarta or Bali 
because they were not deemed as conflict zones. He even claimed that he once 
refused Noordin Top’s request to collaborate in a bombing mission because he did 
not endorse the use of bombs.279 Hence, Sunata’s road to rehabilitation looked 
promising and he was released in 2009. However, a year later, he returned to his 
radical ways and hooked up with his old network of friends. Ansyaad believes that 
just like Urwah, he participated in the deradicalisation programme for pragmatic 
reasons and personal benefits.  
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Sunata was a charismatic leader and he had little problem in finding new 
recruits to join his cause, especially in East Java, which according to police sources, 
was a worrying fact.280 A former webmaster for JI, Abdul Aziz, said that the new 
recruits did not necessarily agree with the idea of using bombs but they share the 
same aspiration with Noordin and company, which was utmost hatred for the U.S. 
and its allies.281 Neighbours of Sunata described the latter as a polite man as he did 
not display any negative characteristics.  
While Sunata rejects the idea of terrorist attacks in Jakarta and Bali, 
intelligence analyst, Dino Chressbon, believes that Sunata had regarded Poso, 
Ambon and Aceh as legitimate battlegrounds for Muslims to launch attacks.282 
Moreover, he had similar views with his JI comrade that killing the leader of the 
region they were fighting in was legitimate. 
IV. THORIQUDIN ALIAS ABU RUSYDAN 
 
 It is worthwhile to examine Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan’s case, although he 
did not participate in the deradicalisation programme. An appreciation of his 
worldview and the environment he operates in could give us a better understanding 
on how the deradicalisation programme ought to be carried out. Former Amir of 
Jemaah Islamiyah, Rusydan took over as the day-to-day caretaker of JI from Abu 
Bakar Baasyir in 2000 and formally assumed the position in April 2002.283 He led JI 
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Mantiqi 2, which oversaw Java, Sumatra and other Indonesian islands. Rusydan was 
arrested in 2003 on charges of sheltering one of the Bali bombers, Mukhlas, and was 
sentenced to three and half years in prison. He was released early in 2005 for good 
behaviour and declared that he rejected all forms of bombings that target innocent 
civilians, including the bombings in December 2000. While Rusydan refused to 
condemn the Bali bombers, he pleaded with all militant groups to reconsider their 
violent strategies.284 He detested participating in the police deradicalisation 
programme in Cipinang prison. After his release in 2005, Rusydan resumed 
supporting JI activities regardless of the conditions attached to his release. Most of 
the Afghan veterans respect and consider him as a suitable leader for JI.285 
 
 Rusydan is the son of Haji Mohammad Faleh, who was the leader of Darul 
Islam. Being the son of former leader of an extremist group, Rusydan is well 
connected in the terrorist networks. Abu Rusydan was born in Kudus, Central Java 
and the region has been notoriously known to harbour numerous terrorist activities. It 
is home to several of the most-wanted terrorists including Abu Tholut alias Mustofa 
and Bagus Budi Pranoto. Faleh was arrested for his alleged involvement in 
Komando Jihad warfare in the 1980s. Rusydan graduated from Surakarta University 
in the School of Social and Political Sciences in 1983. While Rusydan opposed 
democracy and advocates Islamic law adamantly, he is very much against 
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indiscriminate violence.286 He was rejected from the Armed Forces Academy 
(AKABRI) in 1984 because he was related to a DI leader.  
 During one of his counselling sessions in prison, he mentioned that his 
departure to Afghanistan to participate in the war against the USSR in the 1980s was 
not opposed by any of his family members and relatives. He once told BNPT 
officials, “Alhamdullilah, they supported my decision to be a Mujaheedin.”287 When 
asked if Rusydan knew what a terrorist is, he answered as follows,  
“Yang disebut teroris adalah orang-orang yang melakukan dua jenis 
kejahatan, yaitu, kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan dan kejahatan luar biasa. 
Kedua sifat ini tidak ada dalam seorang Muslim karena umat Islam memiliki 
fitrah (kecenderungan alami) yang berarti bahwa umat Islam tidak mungkin 
mau berperang dengan insan yang lain. Yang kafir adalah mereka yang luar 
biasa, seperti George W. Bush dan pasukannya. Mereka adalah orang-orang 
yang kejam dan memberi kemanusiaan dengan masalah. (The so-called 
terrorists are people who commit two types of crimes, namely, crimes against 
humanity and extraordinary crime. Both of these traits do not exist in a Muslim 
because Muslims have fitrah (natural tendencies) which means that Muslims 
are not likely to fight humanity. The non-believers are those who are 
extraordinary, like George W. Bush and his troops. They are the ones who are 
cruel and infuse humanity with problems.)”288 
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Rusydan then went on to explain his definition of a mujahid to the prison 
officer. During one of the “Q&A” session held with students, Isna, an upper 
secondary school student from SMA Negeri 1 Kudus, mentioned that she agreed 
with Ustaz Rusydan on who is a mujahid. She mentioned that she sometimes 
attends Ustaz Rusydan’s lectures at his home or in the mosque. When asked what a 
mujahid is, she said,  
 “Seseorang dianggap mujahid jika dia bersedia untuk memperjuangkan 
kemuliaan Islam dengan hati yang tulus. Karakter nya sering teguh terhadap 
agama dan beliau tidak peduli seberapa hebat tantangannya. Dia bersedia 
mengundang jemaah lain untuk bergabung dengan nya dan selalu siap untuk 
melaksanakan tindakan yang diperintahkan kepadanya. (The person is 
considered a mujahid if he is willing to fight for the glory of Islam with a 
sincere heart. His character is always steadfast towards the religion no matter 
how daunting the challenges are. He is willing to invite others to join his cause 
and is always ready to carry out the actions instructed to him.)”289 
 
 A comparison between Rusydan’s definition of a mujahid and a terrorist 
reveals a chilling distinction. It can be inferred that anyone who wages a war in the 
name of Islam, even if it is fighting against a government or people belonging to 
groups which are deemed as oppressor of Islam, can be considered a mujahid. 
Furthermore, those who regard mujahids as terrorists have been influenced by 
people who hate Islam. Rusydan even called the Indonesian government as thogut 
(an infidel who crossed the line) because firstly, they had robbed God’s prerogative 
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of regulating order in this world, and secondly, they gave rise to a new order which 
promises a better life.290  
V. LUTHFI HAEDAROH ALIAS UBEID  
 Luthfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid is one of the better-known recidivist terrorists. He 
was a member of JI and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and was first convicted in 
2004 for collaborating with Noordin Top and Azahari. Following positive response 
during the prison’s deradicalisation programme, he was released in 2007. After his 
discharge, Ubeid became active in JAT and was a regular speaker in forums as well 
as a facilitator in many of JAT’s taklim sessions. Soon after leaving JAT, he joined 
the Tanzim Al-Qaedah training camp in Aceh as an instructor. His daily activities 
include translating Arabic jihadi themed books into Bahasa Indonesia and distributing 
them among members of the terrorist network. His relapse has been widely regarded 
as the failure of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme by the media.  
 Ubeid hailed from Magetan, East Java and was very firm in his quest for jihad. 
His persuasive personality enabled him to gain public support and sympathy. After a 
brief stint in Poso, he was involved in the military training camp in Aceh as a trainer. 
In 2011, during a district court trial in Jakarta, Ubeid claimed that the people of Aceh 
supported the group’s military training and other activities.291 The support came in 
the form of food aid and organising the training sessions. During the trial, he blamed 
security forces for starting an armed clash in Aceh. He rallied support and sympathy 
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from the local Acehnese by telling them that the security forces had initiated the 
tension and the training camp participants were raided and chased into the 
mountains. This allowed Ubeid to cast a negative light on the security forces and 
influenced the villagers in Aceh to think that the armed clashes are caused by the 
police. In a statement by Son Hadi, spokesperson for JAT, he mentioned that Ubeid 
left JAT due to some differences in opinion.292 Ubeid persuaded JAT to join his 
cause to perform i'dad Jihad in Aceh.293 However, upon Son Hadi’s refusal to 
collaborate with Ubeid in Aceh, the latter parted with JAT and pursued his ambition 
in Aceh. He was made treasurer in Aceh and was responsible for ensuring adequate 
funding to support its operations.  
 Ubeid’s religious knowledge, coupled with his fluency in Arabic, commands 
respect from other prison inmates. After his re-arrest in 2009, Ubeid was sentenced 
to 10 years in jail and was placed in Cipinang prison. As a young cleric, Ubeid 
advocated the need for consolidation among jihadi elements to strengthen the lines 
in anticipation of the call for global jihad initiated by Al-Qaedah.294 While in prison, he 
was active translating religious books to Bahasa Indonesia. These books were 
widely read in prison by inmates and were made available outside prison as well.295 
Besides Sunata and Abu Rusydan, Ubeid was also admired among younger 
inmates. 
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VI. PATTERNS  
The foregoing case studies highlight several important issues, including how 
the jihadists employed “culture.” Cultural manifestations ought to be scrutinised in 
designing the deradicalisation programme for Islamist terrorists in Indonesia. It can 
be concluded that the motivations for recidivism is not solely based on religious 
reasons. While each case study is unique, a host of factors come into play to 
stimulate their re-engagement to terrorism such as income, family support and 
feelings of anti-establishment. However, there could be current and future 
developments that this thesis may have omitted, thus, accounts of the individuals’ 
developments are incomplete. For example, other significant factors involved may 
have played significant roles in the recidivism of the case studies that have not been 
discussed such as, the involvement and instigation of foreign organisations. Their 
involvement may come in the form of funding or logistical support.  
 
Studies including larger samples of cases should be conducted in order to 
gain insight into the factors that play a dominant role in radicalisation processes. The 
combinations of factors that cause radicalisation are indeed abundant, diverse and 
unique for each individual. This implies that no radicalisation processes are the same 
and naturally, the same holds for the cases discussed above. While there are some 
recurring patterns between them, the extent to which causes or catalysts contributed 
to the radicalisation processes vary. These comments notwithstanding, a few 
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a. SOCIAL AND PERSONAL NETWORKS 
Network dynamics appear to have been important factors in all the case 
studies. Personal networks seem to extend beyond their own cell group and it is hard 
or almost impossible to abandon their terrorist group. Peer pressure, groupthink and 
the tendency to conform appear to have exerted substantial influence on these 
individuals. For example, while all of them are associated with JI, they are also well 
known among other extremist groups such as Laskar Jihad, JAT and FPI. In other 
words, when they have altercation with one group, they can join another group. 
Consequently, most seem to have been embedded in close and relatively 
homogeneous networks. While their interconnectedness is complex, they are linked 
together with the same aspiration and mission. In addition, as Osman has argued, 
terrorists are also interconnected through blood and kinship. Robust network 
dynamics is also shown towards their fellow comrades such as the number of 
terrorists who provided shelter for Urwah, Noordin Top and Abu Tholut despite 
knowing that their actions will beget jail time. They were also able to build new 
networks by attracting new followers and recruiting more youths into the cause. 
Breaking and uncovering this network dynamics would perhaps contribute to the 
success of deradicalisation strategy. 
 
Marc Sageman has argued that understanding the dynamics of terrorism 
requires a deeper understanding of networks and cohort groups.296 The value of 
plotting relationships to unearth sources of influence and behavioural patterns is 
highly important. However, paying too much attention to terrorist networks and links 
has been criticised by scholars such as Natasha Hamilton Hart who asserts that 
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researchers will end up in a pointless hunt for terrorists’ links and they will look like 
amateur detectives.297 While Hamilton’s argument is valid, it is still important to break 
the network as far as possible to prevent recidivism.298 
b. PERSONAL AND GROUP BELIEFS 
Unrestricted interaction among inmates had led to the spread of extremist 
teachings of Islam and jihadist’ values and beliefs. These values and beliefs are 
entrenched in anti-Western, anti-modern and anti-democratic attitude, in combination 
with their belief in Zionist conspiracies and salafist jihad ideology.299 Distinctive to 
these terrorists groups is also the rejection of participation in the political process.300 
Other beliefs include skewed definition of a Mujaheedin, and classification of 
legitimate places to wage a jihadist war. Hamilton aptly cautioned against 
pathologising terrorism by taking their ideology more seriously than their 
grievances.301 She divides the terrorists’ motivations into political grievances and 
religious grievances. An emphasis on the later will derail researchers from 
uncovering the true motivations of terrorists.  
 
The Cipinang prison that houses notorious names in the jihad world such as 
Abu Bakar Baasyir, Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, Abu Tholut, ustaz Qital, Luthfi 
Haedaroh alias Ubeid and Ustaz Fahim allows frequent interaction among inmates. 
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When inmates are allowed to perform the obligatory Friday congregational prayers 
together, charismatic individuals such as Abdullah Sunata and Abu Rusydan are 
able to take advantage of such gatherings to extend their influence and rally support 
from other inmates. The interaction that augmented the terrorists’ resilience and 
some of them were even revered as the “bombers who are pious and brave.”302 Most 
prisons such as Palu in Sulawesi, Nania in Ambon and Gunungsari in Makasar do 
not limit the interaction among inmates as well as between inmates and external 
visitors.  
 
Interactions among inmates and at times, prison wardens are influenced by 
the ideology propagated by the terrorists. Yunanto recounted how prison officers 
would sometimes join in the congregational prayers where Abu Bakar Baasyir or Abu 
Tholut is the imam.303 The officers may even attend religious classes and talks 
organised by the inmates themselves. Urwah or Sunata would sometimes invite the 
prison officers themselves to debate on religious matters. Such interaction provides 
a poor setting for a controlled environment in a deradicalisation programme. 
Charismatic terrorists are capable to weakening the aqidah of other inmates, 
enabling the infusion of the jihadist ideology to sip into the latter’s religious beliefs.304 
It provides a platform for recruitment as well as radicalised individuals to become 
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c. ATTITUDE TOWARDS JIHAD 
 
Groups such as JI and JAT interprets jihad in the salafist mujaheedin sense, 
which is beyond the moderate sense of personal spiritual improvement and defence 
of the Muslim community. This includes the moral duty of overthrowing Muslim 
governments and societies considered as apostates.305 Incarceration reinforces a 
mindset that prison is part of the jihadi journey and this mindset spreads across 
inmates. They also endorse the idea that jihad is fardhu ain (mandatory). It also 
gives rise to the unified realisation among detainees that the obstacle to achieving 
an Islamic state is the apostate government and the U.S. policies supporting them.306 
This is infused with a peculiar attitude of the Javanese; they believe in the 
philosophy of three “nga”s; ngalah (relent), ngalih (break away), ngamuk (run 
amok).307 As Javanese, these terrorists will relent to favourable long-term goals; 
however, if their opponents act tough on them, most Javanese would ngalih, or 
break away in search of a strategy to win. However, if the enemy continue to their 
hostility, the Javanese will run amok.308  
 
 Nazarudin Mochtar alias Harun, a detainee in Porong Surabaya, mentioned a 
disturbing credo shared among terrorists detainees to Densus 88 officers, which is, 
“Going to jail is like taking a holiday from jihad, when we are released from prison, 
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we Mujaheedins should be ready for jihad.”309 Moreover, for the terrorists, serving 
prison time is a special moment for them to berkhalwat (to be alone and self-reflect), 
as well as to maximise their devotion time to God.310 This is worrying because, firstly, 
incarceration does not break their spirit to defend the group’s cause. Moreover, it 
heightens their spirit to jihad because they see imprisonment as a form of 
provocation. Secondly, responding positively to deradicalisation programme may just 
be a façade to attain early release; this seems to be a common pattern among all the 
recidivist cases. This observation points to a concern with the environment where the 
deradicalisation programmes take place. The terrorists feel that being in prison will 
not halt their desire to pursue jihad. In fact, the current state of prison environment 
allows an amalgamation of terrorists groups and sharing of resources among 
themselves while in prison. While it is costly for the government to isolate prisoners 
due to the large number of detainees, it is useful to limit the communication among 
detainees and their communal activities in prison. It is only in 2010 that the Cipinang 
Prison set aside dedicated prisons block for terrorists detainees. Akbar Hadi, the 
Dirjen Pemasyarakatan Kemenkumham (Director General of Correctional Facilities, 
Law and Human Rights) stressed in a media interview that the move to set aside a 
dedicated prison block had garnered considerable success. This include: 1) better 
management of prison capacity, 2) tighter control of inmates and 3) a more 
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d. ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNITY 
 
 There appears to be a nonchalant and casual treatment from the community 
towards these terrorists when they are released and relocated to a particular village. 
Even though the villagers know the background of their new neighbours, the former 
chose to tolerate the latter’s presence. The villagers also attend religious classes 
organised by Abu Rusydan and Abdullah Sunata. Moreover, the terrorists’ family 
members support these individuals to follow the path of violent jihad. The existence 
of radical individuals in the villagers had allowed the jihadist ideas – such as 
establishing an Islamic state through jihad - to be accepted and delivered through 
sermons, syarahan, taklims and casual interaction. This proliferation is made more 
intense with the government failing to deliver several promises made to the people 
such as the inability of the government to curb corruption and rising cost of living.312 
This led the radicalised individuals to join extremist groups to realise their aspirations 
and to voice their anger as described in chapter three.  
Examples of indifferent attitudes shown by villagers can be shown in the 
excerpts of their statements interviewed in Kudus and Sidoarjo:313 
“Terorisme itu pekara biasa. Yang teroris itu adalah pemerintah. (Terrorism is 
normal. The government is the real terrorist)”  
  Pak Man, 74 years old, a trishaw rider. 
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“Justeru mau di apain? Asalkan yang jadi target itu bukan kita. Nilai nyawa di 
sini itu kecil. Satu teroris ketembak, sepuluh lagi akan muncul. (What can we do 
about it? As long as we are not the target. The value of lives is low. With one dead 
terrorist, ten more will appear.) ”  
  Mba Sulastri, 50 years old, bakso peddler. 
 
“Saya tidak bermasalah mereka jadi tetangga. Kami capek diinjak-injak, mas. 
Biar mereka sadar dan dengar suara rakyat. (I have no qualms if they (terrorists) are 
my neighbour. We are tired of being oppressed. Let them (government) realise their 
mistake and hear the peoples’ voice”  
  Pak Deni, 62 years old, security guard. 
 
 The interviewees above were individuals I met living in areas where terrorist 
were found to be hiding. Two basic questions were asked: 1) how would you feel 
about terrorists living in your village? and, 2) are you worried about terrorism in 
Indonesia? The questions were asked in Bahasa Indonesia and in some instances, I 
had to ask in Javanese, which they were more fluent. Most of those interviewed were 
not worried about terrorism; they were aware that some of their fellow villagers 
subscribed to jihadist ideas.  
From my several engagements with security agency officials, the communities 
in which these terrorists are nested reject any form of violence, but they harbour anti-
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establishment and anti-Western sentiments.314 Narendra Jatna mentioned that, 
although there is frequent occurrence of protest and violence, even in mosques, 
many of these villagers feel that the threat of terrorism is not their topmost concern. 
Rather, they are more anxious with bread and butter issues. The villagers know that 
the terrorists have specific targets, and the villagers are not among their targets.315  
Hence, Ansyaad admitted that the fight against terrorism is still one-sided.316 
The government had failed to rally support from society to combat terrorism and this 
is certainly counter-productive for any deradicalisation efforts. As such, breeding 
ground for radicalisation is no longer at pesantren or mosques but can happen in any 
place including public schools, shopping malls, cafés and most potently, in cyber-
space. The government must work towards addressing the attitudes and mindset of 
society towards terrorism. At its current state, the Indonesian government lacks the 
capacity to do so, due to inadequate coordination among security agencies and poor 
management of the prison system, which have been discussed in chapter 4. 
e. DISENGAGEMENT PATTERNS  
 None of the case studies showed successful deradicalisation; however, 
temporary disengagement experienced in all the case studies is highlighted in this 
thesis. Disengagement from extremist ideology and violent tendencies was evident 
during incarceration and during the deradicalisation programme. Disengagement 
was thus acted out as a means to secure early release or remission. In other words, 
the imprisoned terrorists disengaged as a desperate measure. As was mentioned by 
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BNPT chief, Ansyaad Mbai, during one interview session, these terrorist convicts will 
put up a show and try to convince prison wardens that they no longer harbour 
jihadist ambitions.317 Abdullah Sunata was almost a shining example of how 
deradicalisation programme can succeed - just like Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron - but 
his positive response to the programme turned out to be deceiving.   
 Disengagement from their personal or social network becomes bleak, 
hampered by freedom of interaction in prison. The terrorists were able to reinforce 
their brotherhood and form new bonds during daily activities in prison. The areas in 
which the released terrorists are being placed are also vulnerable. The villagers in 
these areas do not know what to look out for and who to approach with information 
regarding any suspicious activities by their new “ex-terrorist” neighbour. In a number 
of cases of arrested terrorists, villagers often recounted that while the terrorists 
appeared friendly, they rarely got involved in community activities, sometimes 
showed unusual behaviour, radical in their sermons and often travel outside of their 
village. This allowed the terrorists to consolidate their relationships with terrorists’ 
networks and re-engage in terrorism without being under constant surveillance.  
 Disengagement cannot be sustained in the community due to the presence of 
radical elements. Many of the terrorists are released back into the community, which 
either contains their former networks or religious extremists. Old networks and 
interaction with radicalised individuals re-fuel their need to perform jihad and get 
involved in terrorists activities once again. In most instances, these terrorists often 
find it hard to survive on their own and end up turning to their old networks for 
economical and emotional support. Disengaging from old networks begets criticism 
from other terrorists, being labelled as thogut or infidels. As such, deradicalisation, or 
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even disengagement, becomes unpleasant for them. Furthermore, society is 
incapable of altering the terrorists’ positive image of jihadism, which had initially 
influenced their recruitment to the terrorist group. This is what Horgan terms as 
psychological disengagement, whereby shattering the romantic jihadist dream is 
critical to sever their positive image of violent jihad.318  
While Rusydan appears to be disengaged and has rejected indiscriminate 
violence, it remains unclear to what extent is he disengaged; was he disengaged 
from his ideology, terrorist network, or just violence? Almost all the case studies 
discussed in this thesis recommence their terrorist activities upon release with the 
exception of Abu Rusydan, who continues to rally his anti-establishment sentiments 
in his religious classes and sermons. Rusydan’s post-prison antics and his hard-line 
remarks against the government make his disengagement appear hazier. 
f. I’DAD AND MILITARY PREPARATION 
A significant number of released terrorists joined the Aceh training camp 
either as trainers or administrators to prepare future jihadists for a larger war. This 
emphasises the allure of i’dad or military preparation in which the Quranic chapter of 
At-Taubah, verses 5-6 are commonly cited to endorse engaging in a war for jihad.319 
Despite the discovery of the Aceh camp and its demolition in 2010, many released 
terrorists were still willing to risk joining camps set up by Santoso in Poso and the 
Abu Umar network in Sulawesi. Among those who took part in Aceh were also well-
known and charismatic leaders of the jihadi movements such as JI, JAT and FPI. 
Their recidivism may be driven by the desire to assert command and assure their 
                                                          
318
 John Horgan, in Walking Away from Terrorism, Op. Cit, p 32. 
319
 For literature that traces the perspective of radicals on I’dad and jihad, which includes the perspectives of 
Abu Rusydan and family members of Imam Samudra, see Bilveer Singh and Munir Mulkhan, in Teror dan 
Demokrasi dalam I’dad dan Jihad: Sudut Pandangn Kaum Radikal, Metro Epistema Publishing, 2013.  
  120 
 
supporters that they are still in authority even after prison release. Thus, their 
recidivism has less to do with the camp per se. Abdullah Azzam, also known as 
“Father of Global Jihad”, asserts one of the more controversial views on i’dad. He 
points out that i’dad through irhab (terror) and scare tactics are more important than 
obligations of the pillars of Islam other than the Muslims’ syahadat. This includes the 
killing of children and women, and those who support the democratic system.320  
g. REASONS FOR JOINING THE JIHADIST CAUSE 
Reasons for individuals to join the jihadist cause may not necessarily entail 
religious ideology. A serving prison warden shared that non-terrorist inmates have 
various intentions for joining the jihadist cause. Some are fascinated with the idea of 
increased or higher status in society as a perajurit Islam (Islamic warrior). Others are 
attracted to economic incentives such as the possibility of earning extra income, 
enjoying certain privileges and gaining some extra benefits in the form of tangible 
items or jobs. Interestingly there are those who want to hop into the bandwagon to 
wash away their past sins. Reasons that cause radicalisation or for joining terrorists 
groups have been discussed in the literature review. However, for the case of 
Indonesia, motivations for recruitment should receive particular concern, because, 
any system that is in use currently to assess high-risk detainees should be able to 
detect these individuals. While the Indonesian authorities face an arduous task of 
monitoring freed terrorists whose backgrounds and whereabouts are well known, a 
petty thief or drug dealer who had just join the jihadist network is unlikely to receive 
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special monitoring. Thus, the real problem of violent terrorist acts may not lie with the 
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CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED 
Thus far, the first research question – how individuals get radicalised? - had 
been dealt with in chapters three, four and five.  While historical circumstances have 
given rise to the formation of politically-motivated religious extremist groups, readers 
must understand that every individual traverses through different pathways, thus, the 
need for contextualisation and personalisation of a rehabilitation programme. In 
addition, the role of charismatic religious leaders in the process of radicalisation to 
attract new followers and encourage current ones, as in the case of Abu Rusydan, 
Abdullah Sunata and Abu Bakar Baasyir, should be re-examined for further 
research. In the context of injustices faced by Muslim communities during the New 
Order era and against the backdrop of the post 9-11 security landscape, JI members 
are able to rally support and evoke sympathy towards their jihadist cause 
successfully, partly because their followers may have already embraced anti-
Western or anti-establishment sentiments. Exposure to terrorist networks has also 
augmented the process of radicalisation among prison inmates as well as the 
terrorists featured in the case studies. However, as pointed out in the literature 
review, Horgan distinguishes between “radicalisation” and “violent radicalisation”. As 
such, it is perhaps useful to reframe the first research question as “what causes 
these radicalised individuals to engage in violence?” This is in view of the fact that, 
radicalised individuals may adhere to extremists’ conception of religion but may not 
necessarily engage in violence. 
The main concern of this thesis is reflected in the second research question - 
why despite going through deradicalisation programme, participants still return to 
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their old networks and resume terrorist activities? In other words, Indonesia should 
be concerned at reducing the rate of recidivism and trace the processes that could 
impede the success of the deradicalisation programme. Chapter four addressed the 
second research question, whereby, as Ashour argued, poor prison management 
and lack of coordinated efforts will not achieve an ideal deradicalisation objective. An 
ideal deradicalisation objective occurs on all three levels: behavioural, ideological 
and organisational. Chapter five also discussed the attitude of the community 
towards radicalism and terrorism, which is nonchalant while some are even 
supportive of the terrorists group. The support garnered provided ample room for 
released terrorists to re-engage in terrorists activities without being scrutinised, and 
at the same time preach their jihadist rhetoric to the villagers. A deficient post-prison 
programme without strict legal restrictions will leave released terrorists unmonitored 
and give them the opportunity to re-engage with the terrorists’ network. 
The last research question – what should be deradicalised? – is indeed an 
issue which most government should pay attention. Chapter two shows that 
individuals radicalised in various ways and often, the blame will always be on religion 
and ideology. Only a tailored approach that focuses to individual needs and, to what 
extent they are radicalised, will allow the authorities to decode their cognitive and 
behavioural conditions. Furthermore, it is also important for the Indonesian 
government to sensitise the society on the needs to manage and eradicate all forms 
of radicalism. Thus, while Indonesia may not have the capacity to do so now, it is 
important that it start gearing towards a new approach for the deradicalisation 
programme. The approach should be a complete and self-sustaining with the 
capability to address individual motivations to terrorism and also societal influences 
upon the individual which makes them likely to return to radical ideologies in the 
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event of release.321 The case studies show that the deradicalisation programme 
should not focus on just the programme participants. There is inadequate effort to 
ensure that the community itself is conducive to be the supporting agency for the 
deradicalisation programme during the post-release phase. The revamped 
deradicalisation programme should incorporate community leaders in educating 
members of the community to be tolerant, even between the different orientations of 
Islam. There is also a need to persuade the community to refrain from using violent 
means to champion their extremist beliefs. Cultivating and developing national 
education imbued with the tenets of pancasila is one way to produce a moderate 
community, one which will offer a favorable environment to facilitate the 
deradicalisation of released terrorists. 
II. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Culture is an intricate subject to accurately define and conceptualise due to 
the complex environment that the terrorist operate in against the backdrop of political 
and social history, majority Muslim population, and intricate network dynamics of the 
terrorist groups. It is difficult to determine a cause and effect relationship between 
the experiences of social and prison life and the negative effects, and how such 
experiences may affect the individual terrorist. 
This thesis hinges upon the self-reported data of Indonesia and independent 
verification to deny or confirm the data is partly not possible. Considerations must 
also be given to the difference in the definitions of relevant terms used in various 
literatures and various countries such as “radicalisation” or “deradicalisation.” 
Readers must acknowledge that what may be considered radical activity in 
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Singapore or other parts of the world could be considered normal social behaviour in 
Indonesia. For example, it is typical in Indonesia to hear imams talking about jihad 
and professing anti-western and anti-establishment sentiments during sermons and 
religious classes. Understanding Islam in Indonesia also requires basic, if not 
extensive understanding of the Javanese culture – a dominant culture in Indonesia - 
which has been written extensively in scholarly writings.322 The author acknowledges 
the fact that this issue was not dealt with extensively, partly because of the limited 
time available to examine the rich literature on this subject. However, it is not enough 
to understand the terrorists’ religious view without this cultural background 
knowledge. Walking along “Arab Street” in Surabaya, one might discover Muslims 
worshipping the grave of the wali songo,323 whereas in certain parts of Jogjakarta 
and Kudus, Muslims practice Islam marinated with Javanese psycho-cultural values 
with a tinge of Hinduism and Buddhism. No attempt was made for a comparative 
analysis of Singapore, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia - which run some of the most 
successful rehabilitation programme for radicalised individuals – to offer externally 
valid data to measure success. This is because the deradicalisation programmes are 
implemented under fundamentally different government structures, cultural context 
and legal environment. Indonesia, unlike Singapore, has a majority Muslim 
population and it does not have emergency laws such as the Internal Security Act. 
Unlike Saudi Arabia, Indonesia does not have a solid government control over its 
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deradicalisation programme. The programme in Saudi Arabia is under the direct 
purview of the Minister of Interior, who makes critical decisions on how to run 
deradicalisation programmes.324 However, rigorous comparative analyses of 
Indonesia’s programme with other programmes are widely available electronically 
and in journals. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Can deradicalisation work in Indonesia? Innovative approaches - such as 
economic incentives, religious programme in prison to encourage moderate religious 
views and job schemes - employed by the Indonesian authorities, deradicalisation 
programmes in Indonesia are still useful in the strategy but the programme in its 
entirety still has a long way to go. In terms of counter-radicalisation efforts, Indonesia 
has been highly effective in conducting offensive operations, making successful 
arrests and tracking down recidivist terrorists. Several recommendations are 
presented below to provide an insight to achieve the best strategy. 
a. RECOMMENDATIONS 1 – RELIGION MAY NOT ALWAYS BE THE 
PROBLEM 
Promoting disengagement needs to be carefully implemented within the 
context of the particular culture or socio-political issues experienced by the terrorist 
because every terrorist went through different pathways.325 A deradicalisation 
strategy that focuses on religious rehabilitation must be implemented in tandem with 
addressing certain cultural imperatives of individual inmate, as well as personalised 
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attention. Several inherent problems such as poor prison management, lack of 
coordination among agencies and poor public support stands in the way of an 
effective deradicalisation programme. While disengagement from the terrorist’s 
network and disengagement from violent tendencies are more pragmatic approaches 
to curb recidivism, the key to ensure successful disengagement is cultural 
contextualisation. Ideological deradicalisation on its own may seem ineffective 
because, terrorists have no regards for state appointed ulamas. Moreover, religion 
may not be the main driver for jihadist aspirations. The latter emanates from peer 
pressure, kinship, economic needs, identity formation and anti-establishment 
sentiments. As seen from chapter three, terrorism evolves from politically motivated 
groups which are religiously affiliated. Radicalism rose during the various phases of 
Indonesia’s history due to economic exploitation, demands for separation, curbing of 
religious movements by the government as well demands to reinstate the original 
Jakarta Charter which allows for the mandatory establishment of the syariah laws.  
However, this does not mean that ideology and religion should be played 
down. Religious concepts of jihad, i’dad, fardhu ain and wajib should still be 
deliberated and debated openly or with the radicals to debunk their interpretation 
which promotes violence. This poses several consequences for Indonesia and the 
region. Firstly, the mushrooming of violent radical groups in Indonesia will continue. 
Secondly, a lot of time and resources will be wasted in re-capturing terrorists who go 
into relapse. Thirdly, the threat of Islamic extremism in the region can never be 
eliminated as long as charismatic jihadi leaders such as Abu Bakar Baasyir are still 
influential in Indonesia.  
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b. RECOMMENDATIONS 2 – EFFECTIVENESS OF  THE SOFT 
APPROACH 
The Indonesian model has proven that traditional ‘hard’ methods of coercion 
and “long-term” imprisonment are important to stop the violence but may work 
against achieving the ideal objective of the deradicalisation programme. On the other 
hand, the soft approach of treating terrorists can be viewed both positively and 
negatively. Indonesia has taken a soft stance to the treatment of terrorists with many 
of them receiving better treatment than their counterparts in other correctional 
facilities do. The rationale is that the convicted criminals will be more inclined to 
cooperate with the authorities and they are also less likely to resume their radical 
behaviour once they are released back into the society.326 This assumption is true to 
some extent because of a number of reasons; (1) such an approach is in line with 
international norms of basic human decency, (2) some detainees have actually been 
able to change their radical beliefs through this approach and many scholars believe 
that de-humanising the terrorists only serves to justify their violence and make them 
behave in ways that are morally repugnant.327 The terrorist detainees in the prisons 
receive the best treatment in terms of freedom, access to family members, financial 
service support and access to food and proper sanitation. This is contrary to the kind 
of treatment and attention other inmates receive. The deradicalisation programme is 
divided into several stages and upon serving one third of their prison sentence, they 
are given more freedom and privileges. It is this stage that is actually critical to the 
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deradicalisation programme and one that could spur a relapse. The privileges and 
freedom given to the detainees allow them to communicate with the outside world, 
initiate contact with former terrorist groups and radicalised society members through 
the broadcasting of their messages, lectures and sermons.328 
c. RECOMMENDATIONS 3 – REFORMING THE PRISON SYSTEM 
Poor prison management such as overcrowding and lack of resources will not 
allow any personalised approach during the deradicalisation programme. It is 
essential to note that terrorists only trust each other with information and thus, 
terrorists will not trust others, such as the prison warden, who is termed as an 
intruder. This means that the officer in charge of the detainee must first aim at 
cultivating a long lasting relationship built on trust and mutual consent.329 Once the 
detainee is able to trust the officer, something that happens over time, then the 
officer can use this to appeal to his intellect as well as his emotions to let go the 
rational beliefs and change his violent behaviour. Such a personalised approach will 
require considerable resources even after the terrorists are released from prison. It is 
also important that they be monitored by the same officer who was in charge of them 
to ensure that there is continuity and better understanding of the monitored target. 
Also of great importance is the period immediately after the arrest, when a thorough 
background on the individual should be conducted in order to establish motivations 
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for his extremist behaviour. This should be the starting point, and by addressing 
these problems early, it is possible for them to change their radical beliefs.330  
That religious extremism has been allowed to flourish in prisons is one of the 
key contributory factors to the failure of the programme. While pesantren At-
Tawwabin was set up in prison to instill moderate religious teachings, it became a 
fertile ground to breed radicalisation. An environment which allows the cultivation of 
religious extremism makes it difficult for any deradicalisation strategies to 
succeed.331 Furthermore, many of these terrorists misinterpret the Quran and receive 
guidance from radicalised religious leaders in the prison.332 On the other hand, the 
approach used by the prisons is to carry out religious preaching and using the Quran 
to educate terrorist inmates on the ideal way of Islamic life – which demands the 
highest moral standards and unconditional commitment to God - and reinforce the 
fact that terrorist activities are not the obligation of a Muslim. The problem however, 
is that the terrorists do not accept counseling by state appointed ulamas and feel that 
they are being brain-washed by those MUI officials in the prisons who try to change 
their internalised beliefs about Islam using state propaganda. The detainees are thus 
influenced by those views and reversing their perception is challenging. 
Nevertheless, engaging these terrorists with moderate Islamic teachings should be 
reframed vis-a-vis addressing their personal motivations. 
                                                          
330
 Frank Bovenkerkn, “On Leaving Criminal Organizations,” in Crime, Law and Social Change, no. 55, 2011, pp. 
261-276. 
331
 Mark Woodward et al, “Lessons from Aceh Terrorist Deradicalisation,” Report No.1001, for Consortium for 
Strategic Communication, Arizona State University, May 2010, accessed on 13 September 2012. 
[http://csc.asu.edu/wp-content/uploads/pdf/124.pdf] 
332
 Naureen C. Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, "Beyond Terrorism: Deradicalisation and Disengement from Violent 
Extremism," a paper produced for International Peace Institute, October 2008, accessed on 15 September 
2012. [http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/publications/beter.pdf] 
  131 
 
From the description of deradicalisation programmes in prisons, it is possible 
to identify a high level of division on the approach taken to run the deradicalisation 
programmes. Many scholars and the media have spoken against the use of the soft 
approach through the police, Densus 88 and Islamic religious leaders. Some also 
strongly opposed to the idea of involving former terrorists in the programme.333 Thus, 
without a solid and concerted blueprint for deradicalisation programmes across all 
prisons, the Indonesian government ends up implementing a variety of approaches 
and employing different standards. Literature has shown that tactical strategies like 
those in Indonesia that use force and coercion have been successful to some extent 
in trying to stop the Muslim extremists from advancing their causes.334 However, 
fragmentation within the government agencies makes the implementation process 
becomes less coordinated among the prisons. Police involvement in the whole 
process of deradicalisation is loathed by the terrorists because of the tactics used 
which are similar in other correctional facilities and one that is embedded in the law. 
In so doing, the goal of the programme is derailed in totality. The programme is 
supposed to change beliefs and attitudes of the individuals and not subject 
themselves to another system similar to the other detainees in correctional facilities.  
d. RECOMMENDATIONS 4 – ADDRESSING ECONOMIC 
NECESSITIES 
Terrorists may commit acts of violence in exchange for economic rewards. 
For example, some of the terrorists highlighted in this thesis, and many other 
recidivists not highlighted, find it hard to reintegrate with the larger society and thus, 
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difficulty in finding a stable job and income. Involving in terrorist networks has 
become a culture because, to some extent, it provides terrorists with economic and 
emotional support. Thus, authorities have to work towards delinking the programme 
participants from any form of terrorists’ network. Effective methods include using 
counter-narratives and providing economic incentives to dissuade programme 
participants from going back to their network. While performing jihad is the chief 
priority, terrorists such as Urwah and Abu Tholut perhaps view economic survival 
just as important for themselves and their family. They will turn to the terrorist groups 
not only because they want to uphold the group’s aspirations, but beyond the 
ideological struggle, the terrorists will receive economic assistance from the terrorist 
group. Thus, terrorist networks become a professional association to address all the 
necessities of life and not just an ideological bond. 
e. RECOMMENDATIONS 5 – ADDRESSING THE JIHADIST VALUE 
SYSTEM 
From earlier discussions, I have assumed that changes in values precede 
changes in behaviour, and therefore that is a need to address these values before 
we can influence the terrorists’ behaviours. For example, interacting with JI members 
may lead to assimilation to the individual values and beliefs, and this will lead to 
radicalisation, which often ends up in violent behaviour. Therefore, there is a need to 
instill nationalism or the spirit of pancasila to moderate their views. Horgan might find 
this assumption problematic and simplistic, because the link between views and 
behaviour is far more complex.335 However, in the case of Indonesia, where 
radicalisation is more rampant than it seems, and has become a norm in some 
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villages, a deliberate attempt to re-calibrate the value system of terrorist is perhaps 
necessary.  
f. RECOMMENDATIONS 6 – THE INEFFECTIVE USE OF EX-
TERRORIST 
The Indonesian government and the police have resorted to the use of ex-
terrorists which can either produce a positive result, or vice versa. The rationale for 
the use of the former terrorist is to show other terrorists that their actions are 
wrong.336 It is also a good strategy to get the ex-terrorists to be counselors because 
they are the same people who carried out the recruitment. Thus, their changed views 
to abandon violence can encourage the convicted terrorists. This strategy also 
enables the police to gather information to aid a better understanding of the 
terrorists’ strategies and hideouts. However, using ex-terrorists would mean that 
these individuals have been turned around by the government and made as 
instruments to help hunt down their comrades. Many terrorist groups will 
automatically view these individuals as traitors in the sense that they failed to 
complete the mission.337 As much as the police may obtain information on the 
terrorists’ plans and any other relevant information, the later view these former 
terrorists as a threat to their mission and interacting with them may cause a 
drawback. The detainees would end up leaking information which may actually lead 
to further arrests and revealing the details of their operations. However, the strategy 
can also backfire as these former terrorists view the government as using them 
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against their will. Deradicalisation is about the individuals and their motivations, and 
the use of former terrorists may not be a good plan in unearthing the motivations of 
individuals towards terrorist activities.338 A personalised approach to the whole issue 
of deradicalisation is necessary because it is not viable to assume similar drives to 
terrorism as individuals are different and environmental forces influencing them are 
also different.  
g. RECOMMENDATIONS 7 – DERADICALISING THE COMMUNITY 
The deradicalisation programme conducted mainly in prison has excluded 
other radicals in the society and thus, society is still engulfed in the problem of 
reducing the chances of success upon release from prison. The Indonesian 
government implements the prison deradicalisation programme for detainees 
through the use of the police, prison wardens and religious leaders. The problem lies 
with the authorities neglecting former terrorists and other members of the community 
who may bear grievances towards the government as shown in chapter three, for 
past atrocities, unequal treatment or poor government administration. The most 
appropriate strategy for the government is to address these grievances and win the 
hearts of the general public. This includes cleaning up the negative image – 
perceived by the general public - of the government and the security agencies such 
as the armed forces, police and Densus 88. Secondly, a plan should be drawn up 
involving multiple government agencies to educate the society on how best Islam 
should be practiced and how to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. 
The root of the problem stems from the community where the radicals 
originate and where the detainees return to. When these communities are not 
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harnessed in the deradicalisation programmes, the “deradicalisation” process is 
halted upon their release from prison. The already-radicalised villages may in turn 
become the catalysts to motivate ex-convicts to re-engage in the acts of terrorism.339 
Society’s attitude towards terrorism is an important determinant to achieve an overall 
successful deradicalisation programme because, it can potentially re-cultivate the 
norms and behaviours of the ex-convicts, be it terrorists or non-terrorists. More often 
than not, deradicalisation programmes are centered on the terrorists. While 
considerable resources are spent on integrating programme participants back into 
the community, little efforts are being made to ensure that the community itself is 
conducive to achieve success for the deradicalisation programme. The environment 
should consist of a community in which the majority subscribes to more peaceful and 
tolerant view of the religion. If there is an overwhelming population or the existence 
of groups which support radical religious ideas and the desire to set up an Islamic 
state through violent means, releasing a terrorist into that community will greatly 
decrease the chance of deradicalisation.340 Terrorists have begun to employ newer 
methods to recruit and these include online radicalisation. Therefore, the ex-convicts 
released into society could still pose a problem because most citizens have not been 
educated on the need to support them psychologically, emotionally and even 
religiously. Moreover, it is a concern that the community may be adhering to radical 
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ideologies and this could hamper the rehabilitation process of the released terrorist 
during the post release phase.341  
The deradicalisation programme should not rely on the prison’s programme 
and the prisoners alone but should be able to integrate and bring together a system 
wide approach to include the community.342 This approach should involve a great 
deal of institutions as well as community members in helping change radical beliefs 
in the society. Society involvement is thus an important step in ensuring that new 
recruitment is eliminated and released terrorists do not go back to committing violent 
acts.  
h. RECOMMENDATIONS 8 – PROPER TRAINING FOR PRISON 
WARDENS 
It is also essential that the prison wardens in charge of the deradicalisation 
prgrammes be properly trained on both the physical and psychological aspects of the 
process in order to better understand terrorists’ behaviours and actions. This will 
facilitate their understanding on the terrorists’ needs and also be able to genuinely 
recognise change in behaviours. It is impossible to expect non-trained police and 
prison officers to be effective on the job. This assumption is quite dangerous to the 
process and the officers themselves. If the detainees harbor feelings of suspicions 
while undergoing the deradicalisation programme, they will slip into a position to 
justify their radical and violent behaviours towards the security personnel. 
Culminating into violent behaviour is possible when they are exposed to de-
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humanising situations such as during arrests or interrogation. All trained officers 
ought to ensure a thorough evaluation of the terrorist is carried out to aid their 
understanding of the latter’s motivations towards terrorism. A background check of 
the detainee is useful to seek the most effective way to help them change their 
beliefs and attitudes. 
IV. CONCLUSION – DISENGAGEMENT AS THE BEST STRATEGY 
Overall, there is a need to understand that deradicalisation per se may work in 
theory but the ground realities show that it is challenging to operationalise it. Many 
scholars have voiced their concerns on this and many have argued for approaches 
that combine both disengagement and deradicalisation.343 The rationale behind this 
is that the process of disengagement involves a change in behaviour, refraining from 
violence and ceasing involvement with the terrorist organisations and does not 
necessarily involve a change in beliefs. Deradicalisation on the other hand is aimed 
at changing the individual’s belief system and to encourage them to abandon 
extremist ideologies and embrace mainstream values. However, disengagement for 
now may be the best option for Indonesia to reduce the rate of recidivism and lower 
the chances of violent incidents. The difficulty in changing the mindset of the 
terrorists lies in their entrenched beliefs and ideologies. Moreover, the principles of 
jihad in the extremist ideology are viewed as religious obligations by the terrorist 
groups. 
Disengagement should be the first course of action and, more importantly, 
must always be voluntary. If disengagement is made under false promises, it means 
that when they are released, the terrorists are best placed to relapse and return to 
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committing violent acts. Only after a successful disengagement can the government 
work towards diffusing the threat of terrorism by encouraging the terrorists to 
deradicalise.344 These would include embracing pancasila, which would encourage 
the former terrorists to appreciate multiculturalism, practicing tolerance, respecting 
Indonesia’s constitution and, at the same time, ensuring their family well-being. 
Nevertheless, as shown by the literature review, some scholars are of the opinion 
that the goal of the rehabilitation programmes should be focused on cognitive shifts, 
which is rather more challenging. Challenging the Islamic views of charismatic 
leaders such as Abu Rusydan, Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abdullah Sunata and Son Hadi is 
not an easy task. They are very critical of counter-narratives to the jihadist ideologies 
by the state and their ability to defend the jihadists’ ideology attracts a substantial 
number of supporters from the Muslim population. Combined with public sympathy 
towards jailed jihadists and weak government policies, deradicalisation faces a bleak 
prospect.345 The fact that terrorist groups are able to provide individuals with an 
alternative avenue for support – be it economic or social – security agencies should 
not neglect these networks. In the eyes of the public and the world, only statistics on 
number of terrorist-related incidents, arrests and bombings can truly be accountable 
for the triumph of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme. 
V. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There is a considerable amount of literature on the aspect of deradicalisation 
and rehabilitation programmes; however, ‘disengagement’ receives relatively lesser 
attention. A number of scholars have tried to explain the concept of disengagement, 
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but an in-depth analysis may actually be required in order to effectively understand 
this concept.346 Moreover, further research to understand the link between radical 
beliefs and disengagement should be explored to understand how a change in 
behaviour is possible through the process of disengagement.347 Although scholars 
have tried to explain the push and pull factors of terrorism and motivations to leave 
terrorism, a great deal of research is paramount to identify the positive aspects that 
can be used to influence disengagement and hence, ensuring its success.  To 
achieve a successful disengagement model, more emphasis should be placed on 
the individual offender rather than dealing with terrorism as a whole problem. 
Applying ‘cultural contextualisation’ allows the prison officer to understand the 
immediate needs of the terrorist and address those needs to achieve disengagement 
in the most reliable way.  
 Speaking of rehabilitation of terrorists and the violent means towards 
achieving of religious obligations or personal goals, it is possible to see a great deal 
of efforts being placed on deradicalisation. Most researchers have explored this 
concept to great depth. It is possible to see that much of it actually focuses on places 
where radicalisation takes place and how deradicalisation efforts can be applied to 
these places in order to change ideological beliefs of individuals.348 There are other 
parts of the literature that essentially focus on the motivations to radicalisation with 
most of them identifying discrimination, foreign occupation and counter-terrorist 
overreaction as triggers of radical beliefs.349 Therefore, in essence, deradicalisation 
programmes are built upon the identification of radical beliefs and their triggers and 
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how these could be eliminated. Many literatures have identified a number of 
approaches to doing this. Nevertheless, there are few studies that have attempted to 
link between culture and radicalisation. Therefore, it is perhaps relevant for future 
research to accord importance on the impact of culture on implementing 
deradicalisation programme.  
Advancement in technology and communications could also impede 
deradicalisation programme. I have provided a cursory account on how terrorists 
utilise technology to maintain an open communication channel with their networks in 
chapter four and five. It is increasingly becoming difficult for terrorists to operate 
given the increased pressure on them to cede ground and join the mainstream 
views. Under these pressures, radical groups have come up with better ways to 
recruit new followers and spread their ideologies and beliefs. The internet and the 
advancements in technology have enabled this to materialise. Most literatures ignore 
the rise of technology and its impacts on terrorist groups as well as its influence on 
the ability of the radicals to spread messages with ease and recruit new members 
with ease.350 Few researches have been carried out on internet radicalisation, which 
is presumably becoming one of the most sought after method of spreading radical 
beliefs. The ubiquity of the internet allows one message to be transmitted across the 
world to a large number of readers and this allows the sender to gather immediate 
followers. Radicalisation is not limited to radical camps in the 21st century but is 
propelled by the rise in the use of the internet and the realisation that the internet can 
do a better job in terms of broadcasting those beliefs and recruiting followers not only 
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at home but also on the international front.351 Therefore, research needs to identify 
what forms of technology are easily available to terrorists and how do they make use 
of the technology to spread radical ideologies. It should also focus on the ways that 
programmes can be structured through the use of technology to limit access to 
radical messages and to also prevent young techno-savvy youths from accessing 
such materials. Technology can cut both ways and the internet as a matter of fact, 
can be very effective in recruiting followers and acting as a communication tool to 
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